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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court correctiy awarded attorney's fees under Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-27-56(1) by specifically finding that the 
Defendants/Appellants James and Julie Lloyd (the "Lloyds") defense of the case 
was without merit and asserted in bad faith. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the trial court in 
Plaintiffs/Appellees Andrew and Joan Gallegos' (the "Gallegos") Memorandum in 
Support of their Motion for Attorney's Fees and Establishment of Costs, (R. at 
288-290), and at the hearing on the Gallegos' Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
Establishment of Costs. (R. at 397; Trans, of Ruling Only on 6/28/06 and 
Motion on Attorney's Fees on 11/2/06, pp. 9-37.)1 
1
 For the Court's convenience, a true and correct copy of the oft: cited 
Transcript of Ruling Only on 6/28/06 and Motion on Attorney's Fees on 11/2/06 
is attached hereto as Addendum D. (R. 397.) The Gallegos will hereinafter cite to 
the Transcript of Ruling Only on 6/28/06 and Motion on Attorney's Fees on 
11/2/06 as Addendum D. 
1 
Standard of Review: The determination of whether a trial court's findings of 
fact in support of an award of attorney's fees are legally sufficient is a question of 
law reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 
1998). The question of whether the evidence adequately supports a trial court's 
findings of fact which in turn sustain an award of attorney's fees is reviewed under 
a clearly erroneous standard. Menzies v. Galitka, 2006 UT 81, 11 55, 150 P.3d 
480. Likewise, a trial court's determination that an action was defended in bad 
faith is a factual determination reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, 11 21, 20 P.3d 868. 
II. Whether the trial court correctly awarded attorney's fees as 
consequential damages. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the trial court in the 
Gailegos' Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
Establishment of Costs, (R. at 288-290), and at the hearing on the Gailegos' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Establishment of Costs. (R. at 397; Addendum 
D.) 
2 
Standard of Review: The determination of whether attorney's fees are 
recoverable in an action is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Wcarce, 
961P.2dat315. 
PROVISIONS OF STATUTES AND RULES 
The interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56(1) and Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9), are of importance to this appeal, copies of which are 
attached hereto as Addenda A and B respectively 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
This is a trespass case which arose from a situation where the Lloyds 
constructed their home in such a fashion that it encroached approximately 38' on to 
the Gallegos3 adjacent lot, thereby appropriating the superior views and topography 
enjoyed by the Gallegos5 lot. The case was tried to Judge John Paul Kennedy on 
June 27-28, 2006. The trial court ruled in favor of the Gallegos and entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Decree on July 19, 
2006. (R. at 305-319) ? Based on its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
2
 For the Court's convenience, a true and correct copy of the trial court's oft 
cited Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached hereto as Addendum 
C. (R. 305-316.) The Gallegos will hereinafter cite to the trial court's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law as Addendum C. 
3 
the trial court awarded the Gallegos their attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-56(1) and as consequential damages to the Lloyds' trespass. (See id) The 
amount of said fees was established by Rule 73 motion, and the trial court affirmed 
its award of fees as well as the amount thereof in its Supplemental Judgment for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs that was entered on November 15, 2006. (R. at 370-
372). This appeal followed. 
Statement of Facts 
This case arose when the Lloyds constructed a portion of their home and 
related landscaping on a residential building lot owned by the Gallegos ("Lot 102") 
in the Emigration Oaks Subdivision in Salt Lake County. (Addendum C at 11 13.) 
After being confronted with the trespass by the Gallegos, the Lloyds failed to 
initiate any action to address or otherwise resolve the boundary, tide and 
expropriation issues created by their trespass. (Addendum C at 11 29.) As a result, 
the Gallegos had no choice but to retain counsel and bring this action for trespass 
and quiet tide against the Lloyds to resolve the boundary encroachment, adjust the 
property boundaries, obtain recompense for the taking and otherwise render their 
lot usable and marketable. (Id.) 
4 
Although the Lloyds correctiy assert that they did not contest their physical 
encroachment onto Lot 102, they did contest the intentional element of the 
Gallegos3 trespass claim. (Addendum C.)3 Indeed, the Lloyds3 defense to this 
action was that they were unaware of their encroachment at the time they 
constructed their home on a portion of Lot 102. (Id at HH 9 and 14.) In support 
of their defense, the Lloyds testified that they were unaware that the construction 
of their home was not proceeding according to their approved site plan, and that 
they relied on other professionals to properly stake their home and notify them that 
their home was not located according to the approved site plan. (Id.) 
Following a two-day bench trial on June 27 and 28, 2006, the trial court 
found that the Lloyds3 committed the intentional tort of trespass and awarded the 
Gallegos damages. (See id) The trial court also awarded the Gallegos their 
attorney's fees as consequential damages and/or under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
(Id.) In awarding the Gallegos3 attorney's fees as consequential damages, the court 
reasoned that as a direct consequence of the Lloyds3 trespass and subsequent failure 
3
 Unfortunately, the Gallegos are unable to cite to trial testimony because 
the Lloyds failed to order a transcript of any trial testimony for purposes of this 
appeal. (See R. at 393). Thus, the Gallegos cite to the trial court's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law at Addendum C for the appropriate inferences of the 
Lloyds3 defense and testimony at trial. 
5 
to do anything to address or resolve their trespass, the Gallegos were required to 
obtain legal counsel and pursue this action in order to resolve the boundary 
encroachment, adjust the lot boundaries, and render their lot usable and 
marketable. (Addendum C at 11 29.) 
The trial court supported its award of attorney's fees under § 78-27-56 with 
detailed findings of fact. (Id at 29.) Specifically, the trial court found: (1) that 
the Lloyds5 defense of the action was without merit (Id. at 11 29) because their 
assertions that they were unaware that their home was constructed on the Gallegos3 
property and that they relied on other professionals to ensure that they were 
constructing their home in the proper location, were not credible (Id at 11 14); and 
(2) the Lloyds5 failed to act in good faith in their defense of the action because they 
lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their actions (Id at 11 29) in defending 
the case by testifying falsely. (Id at 11 14). The court reached this conclusion by 
finding that the physical markers and topography of the site were such that it was 
essentially impossible for a sentient being to not realize that the house was being 
built contrary to the official site plan approved by Salt Lake County. (Id at 11 15.) 
Specifically, the court found: 
There were several physical markers required by the Lot 
106 Site Plan which never materialized during the 
6 
construction of the Lloyds5 home. These markers 
included: 1) the presence of a 12 to 14 foot high 
embankment on the west side of the Lloyd Home; 2) the 
presence of two large retaining walls on both the west 
and east side of the driveway; and 3) an average grade on 
the driveway of 8.5% with a maximum grade of 10%. 
The absence of these markers provided unmistakable 
notice to the Lloyds that their home was being 
constructed in the wrong location. 
The Lloyds were negligent in going forward with the 
construction of their home as staked because the Lloyds 
knew; or should have known, that the staking and 
subsequent construction of their home violated the 
requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan. 
The Lloyds disregarded the requirements of the Lot 106 
Site Plan to their considerable advantage. 
Motive existed for the Lloyds to ignore the requirements 
of the Lot 106 Site Plan. This motive included: 1) 
avoiding increased excavation costs associated with the 
excavation required by the Lot 106 Site Plan; 2) an 
improved view with southern exposure; and 3) 
constructing a relatively flat driveway rather than the 
average 8.5% slope contemplated by the Lot 106 Site 
Plan. 
(Addendum C at 1HI 15-18.) 
Subsequent to trial, during the hearing on the Gallegos3 Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Establishment of Costs on November 2, 2006, the trial court 
affirmed its initial findings supporting its award of attorney's fees. (See Addendum 
D; R. at 370-372.) Specifically in support of its award of attorney's fees under 
7 
§ 78-27-56, the court stated that cc[Mr. Lloyd's] conduct after litigation 
commenced was also in bad faith as evidenced in part by the fact that he came to 
court and testified, in my opinion, totally without credibility." (Addendum D at p. 
35.) In support of its award of attorney's fees as consequential damages, the trial 
court stated that 
[i]t was entirely foreseeable that Mr. Lloyd's conduct 
would necessitate at least some attorney's involvement 
and as time went on it became more and more evident, it 
seems to me, that there would be substantial attorney's 
involvement, and I don't see a good faith effort on behalf 
of the Lloyds to resolve the matter either earlier or even 
now. 
(Addendum D at 36). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court correcdy awarded attorney's fees under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56. The trial court made specific factual findings following trial, and 
during the hearing on the Gallegos' Motion for Attorney's Fees, that the Lloyds' 
defense of the action was without merit and asserted in bad faith. In support of its 
legal conclusion that the Lloyds' defense was without merit, the court made specific 
factual findings that the Lloyds' testified totally without credibility in their defense. 
In support of the court's factual finding of bad faith, the trial court made the 
specific finding that the Lloyds lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their 
8 
actions in defending the case in part by testifying falsely at trial. The trial court's 
legal conclusions are correcdy supported by its findings of fact. Further, the trial 
court's findings concluding are well-supported in the evidence and are not clearly 
erroneous. Foremost, Plaintiffs failed to marshal the evidence regarding the trial 
court's findings of facts that the Lloyds' trial testimony was not credible. Indeed, 
the Lloyds failed to order a transcript of the trial testimony in the case, let alone 
present that testimony for this Court's consideration. 
II. The trial court correcdy awarded attorney's fees as consequential 
damages. As a direct consequence of the Lloyds' trespass and their subsequent 
failure to address or otherwise resolve their trespass, the Gallegos were required to 
retain legal counsel and pursue this action in order to resolve the boundary 
adjustment, adjust the lot boundaries, and render their lot useable and marketable. 
This circumstance is not unlike the situation where tide to real property conveyed 
by warranty deed is encumbered and the grantee has to incur fees to remove the 
encumbrance and quiet tide. Utah courts have long allowed recovery of attorney's 
fees in such a circumstance, reasoning that they—as in this case—constitute a 
necessary cost incurred to render their property marketable and free from defects. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
The instant appeal provides this Court with the unique opportunity to affirm 
a trial court's well-reasoned award of attorney's fees correctly supported by specific 
and undisputed findings of fact under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) or as 
consequential damages of the tort of trespass. 
The Lloyds' attempted to defend this case by testifying that, despite the 
significant and obvious deviations from their approved site plan, they were unaware 
that the construction of their home was not proceeding according to the site plan 
and/or that they relied on other professionals to notify them that they might be 
building their home in the wrong place, namely, on the Gallegos' ideal flat, hilltop 
property Not surprisingly, the trial court expressly found the facts to be 
completely inconsistent with the Lloyds' testimony, and that the Lloyds knew or 
should have known that they were building their home in the wrong place. As a 
result, the court expressly found the Lloyds' testimony to be totally without 
credibility 
Based on these findings of fact, the trial court specifically found that the 
Lloyds' defense of the case was without merit and asserted in bad faith, and 
correctly awarded attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1). 
Significantiy, in contesting the trial court's award of fees, the Lloyds failed to 
10 
marshal a scintilla of evidence to challenge the court's findings of fact upon which 
its award is based. Accordingly this Court should summarily affirm the trial 
court's findings of fact, and the award of attorney's fees correctiy supported by 
those findings. 
In addition, the trial court found that as a direct consequence of the Lloyds' 
trespass and their subsequent failure to address or otherwise resolve their trespass, 
the Gallegos were required to retain legal counsel and pursue this action in order to 
render their property marketable. Although there is an absence of authority 
awarding attorney's fees as consequential damages of the tort of trespass, this case 
presents this Court with the ideal factual context in which to eliminate the 
tort/contract distinction. This case is analogous to the situation where tide to real 
property conveyed by warranty deed is encumbered and the grantee has to incur 
fees to remove the encumbrance and quiet tide. Utah courts have routinely 
allowed recovery of attorney's fees in this situation, reasoning that they—as the trial 
court did in this case—constitute a necessary cost incurred to render their property 
marketable and free from defects. Thus, this case presents this Court with the 
unique opportunity to affirm the trial court's award attorney's fees as consequential 
damages to the tort of trespass under a longstanding real property doctrine. 
11 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S 
FEES UNDER § 78-27-56 BY SPECIFICALLY FINDING THAT 
THE LLOYDS5 DEFENSE WAS WITHOUT MERIT AND 
ASSERTED IN BAD FAITH. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) provides: 
[i]n civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith... 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (1988) (cc§ 78-27-56"). Section 78-27-56 
establishes a two-part test to determine whether attorney's fees should be awarded 
to a prevailing party in a civil action. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 
(Utah 1998). A trial court may award a prevailing party attorney's fees if it 
determines that the defense to the action was (1) without merit, and (2) not 
asserted in good faith. IdL Further, ccif the court finds both elements of the statute, 
then it has no discretion and must award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 
party.55 Watkiss 8c Campbell v. Foa 8c Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991). 
In the instant case, the trial court correctly awarded the Gallegos their 
attorney's fees under § 78-27-56. The trial court supported its award of attorney's 
fees by making specific and express findings that mirror the two-part test outiined 
in § 78-27-56. (Addendum C at Hlf 14-29.) Indeed, the court specifically found 
that the Lloyds5 defense of this action was (1) without merit, and (2) not asserted 
12 
in good faith. (Addendum C at 11 29.) The court further supported these findings 
with specific findings of fact, notably that the Lloyds5 testimony in their defense 
was not credible and that they lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their 
actions in defending against the Gallegos3 claims. (Id at 1ffl 14 and 29.) 
Accordingly this Court should affirm the trial court's award of attorney's fees 
under §78-27-56(1). 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Lloyds5 Defense 
Was Asserted in Bad Faith. 
It is largely a factual matter for the trial court to determine whether an 
action was defended in bad faith and, thus, this determination is reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, If 21, 20 
P. 3d 868. In addition, given the factual nature of a court's determination that an 
action was defended in bad faith, a party challenging such a finding is required to 
marshal the evidence under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Wcarce, 961 P.2d at 315-316; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
In challenging the trial court's finding that the Lloyds3 asserted their defense 
in bad faith, the Lloyds3 attempt to convert the factual determination of bad faith 
into a legal determination by arguing that the trial court misconstrued § 78-27-56 
to exclusively punish the Lloyds3 pre-litigation conduct. (Lloyds3 Br. at 21-24.) 
13 
Specifically the Lloyds assert that "the trial court made no findings as to the 
conduct of Lloyds within the litigation other than stating that it found Mr. Lloyd's 
testimony "not credible." (Lloyds' Br. at 21-22.) The Lloyds' transparent attempt 
to convert a well-established question of fact into a question of law—and avoid the 
attendant burdens associated with challenging the trial court's findings of 
fact—should be rejected. 
1. The Trial Court's Finding of Bad Faith is Based on the 
Lloyds' Conduct During Litigation. 
For purposes of § 78-27-56, a finding of a lack of good faith is synonymous 
with a finding of bad faith. See Cady v. Tohnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151-152 (Utah 
1983). In the instant case, the trial court found that: 
the Lloyds failed to act in good faith in their defense of 
this action. In particular, the Lloyds lacked an honest 
belief in the propriety of their actions and, ultimately, 
took advantage of Plaintiffs' property rights of which they 
knew or should have known. 
(Addendum C at U 29) (emphasis added). This clear and unambiguous language 
reveals that the trial court specifically found that the Lloyds' asserted their defense 
in bad faith. See Cady, 671 P.2d at 151-152. This finding is, without question, 
based on the Lloyds' conduct during the litigation. 
14 
Further, as the Lloyds acknowledge, the trial court found that their 
testimony—not just Mr. Lloyd's—was incredible. (Lloyds5 Br. at 21-22.) The 
Lloyds3 defense to this action was that they were unaware of their encroachment at 
the time they constructed their home on a portion of the Gallegos5 lot.4 
(Addendum C at If IT 14-18.) In support of this defense, the Lloyds testified at trial 
that they were unaware that the construction of their home was not proceeding 
according to their approved site plan, and that they relied on other professionals to 
properly stake their home and notify them that their home was not located 
according to the approved site plan. (Id at 11 14.) The trial court, however, 
specifically found: 
[T]he Lloyd's assertion that they were unaware of the fact 
that the construction of their home was not proceeding 
according to the Lot 106 Site Plan and, hence, that they 
were not aware of any potential encroachment onto Lot 
102, is not credible. Likewise, the Lloyd's assertion that 
they relied upon other professionals to properly stake 
4
 Interestingly, in their filings below, the Lloyds3 acknowledge they 
committed the intentional tort of trespass upon "discovering" the trespass ccvery 
early35 in the litigation. (R. at 270.) This assertion (Le,, that they admitted the 
trespass) is contradicted by their own contention that they "discovered53 their 
intentional tort some eight years after they had committed it, and their defense that 
they were unaware that they were building their home in the wrong place, namely, 
on the Gallegos3 property. Trespass is an intentional tort which means you know 
what you were doing when you did it. One cannot logically admit to an 
intentional tort and then concurrendy argue that they "discovered35 it eight years 
later. The assertion is nonsensical. 
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their home or notify them that their home was not 
located according to the Lot 106 Site Plan, is not 
credible. 
(Addendum C at 11 14.) 
Although they obliquely acknowledge this finding, the Lloyds attempt to 
dilute its import by arguing that cc[i]n virtually every litigation there will be a 
requirement that the court find one version of the facts as given by one side more 
credible than the other" and cc[t]hat this finding has never been held sufficient by 
itself to uphold an award of attorneys [sic] fees under Section 78-27-56." (Lloyds' 
Br. at 21-22.) The Lloyds fail to appreciate the difference between a trial court's 
finding that one party's testimony is more credible than another, and a trial court's 
finding that a partes testimony is not credible at all. 
In the instant case, the trial court did not merely find that the Lloyds' 
testimony was less credible than the Gallegos', it found that the Lloyds' testimony 
was "not credible." (Addendum C at 11 14.) In other words, the trial court 
determined that the Lloyds testified falsely in their defense. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d 
at 315. Moreover, contrary to the Lloyds' assertion, Utah courts have long held 
that a finding that a party has testified falsely in an attempt to avoid liability 
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compels the award of attorney's fees under § 78-27-56. See id; see also Topik v. 
Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1987).5 
In addition, during the hearing on the Gallegos' Motion for Attorney's Fees, 
counsel for the Lloyds asserted the very argument they present on appeal, namely, 
that the trial court's finding of bad faith was based on the Lloyds3 pre-litigation 
conduct, not their conduct in defending the case. (See Addendum D at pp. 9-37.) 
In response to this argument, the trial court made clear that: 
There are, at least, two bases for awarding fees in this 
case. One is the statutory basis and I think that not only 
was Mr. Lloyd's conduct before the litigation commenced 
in bad faith, but I think his conduct after the litigation 
commenced was also in bad faith as evidenced in part by 
the fact that he came to court and testified, in my 
opinion, totally without credibility . . . I did feel that the 
evidence rose to a preponderance level and that would be 
adequate in my opinion, given his post-commencement 
of litigation conduct that I think would justify the award 
of damages for bad faith in the litigation process. 
So I feel that the bad faith is evidenced both before 
and after the commencement of the litigation. 
5
 In Topik, the court's findings of bad faith and meritiess defense in support 
of its award of attorney's fees under § 78-27-56 were both based on the party's 
attempt to avoid liability by testifying falsely See Topik, 739 P.2d at 1104. This 
reasoning is sound because if a party testifies falsely in her defense, there is 
necessarily an absence of facts to support her defense, and the determination that 
she testified falsely is evidence that she lacked an honest belief in the propriety of 
her actions in testifying. (See §§ I. A. 3. through B. infra.) Indeed, parties 
testifying falsely in their defense is ostensibly the precise conduct that § 78-27-56 
was designed to punish. 
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(Addendum D at p. 35) (emphasis added). The court's findings both at trial and 
during the hearing on the motion for attorney's fees negate the Lloyds3 assertion 
that the trial court misconstrued § 78-27-56 to exclusively punish the Lloyds3 pre-
litigation conduct. 
Given the trial court's express findings of fact that the Lloyds asserted their 
defense in bad faith and that they testified falsely in their defense, the remaining 
seminal question is whether these factual determinations are clearly erroneous. See 
Warner, 2000 UT 102 at U 21. The Lloyds3 failure to meet their burden to order a 
transcript and marshal the evidence to protest these findings of fact, however, 
renders the answer to this question academic. 
2. The Lloyds5 Failure to Marshal the Evidence Compels 
Affirming the Trial Court's Finding that They Asserted 
Their Defense in Bad Faith. 
When challenging a finding of fact, this Court will generally not address the 
challenge unless the appellant has properly "marshaled the evidence.33 Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9); United Park City Mines Co. v Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, 1f 24, 140 P3d 1200; State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, K 13, 
983 P2d 556; Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433-34 (Utah 1998). Specifically, 
in order to adequately challenge a finding of fact, the challenging party must 
"marshal all the supporting evidence and demonstrate its insufficiency33 Utah Dept. 
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of Social Services v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis original). The marshaling requirement "serves the important 
function of reminding litigants and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to 
the fact finder at trial.55 Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991); accord State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Further, 
marshaling "provides the appellate court the basis from which to conduct a 
meaningful and expedient review of facts challenged on appeal." Robb v. 
Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The "insistence on compliance with the marshaling requirement is not a case 
of exalting hypertechnical adherence to form over substance." State v. Larsen, 828 
P.2d 487, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), affd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). CC[AJ 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority 
cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research." IcL Further, when a party fails to perform the 
critical task of marshaling the evidence, tins Court cccan rely on that failure to affirm 
the lower court's findings of fact." United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35 at 11 
27. 
The trial court's finding that the Lloyds asserted their defense in bad faith is 
a factual determination by the court which invokes the marshaling requirement. 
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Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315-316; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The Lloyds utterly 
failed, however, to marshal a scintilla—let alone all—of the evidence supporting the 
trial court's determination that they asserted their defense in bad faith. (See Lloyds' 
Br. at § II.) In addition, although the Lloyds' acknowledge that the trial court 
found their testimony to be incredible (Id at 21-22), they failed to even order a 
transcript of the testimony presented at trial—the very evidence on which the 
court's finding of bad faith is based. (R. at 393.)6 Consequently, with no 
transcript before it, this court is bound to presume that the findings are supported 
by adequate, competent evidence. Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 
1985); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P2d 998, 1002 (UT App. 1989). 
The Lloyds have failed to properly marshal any, let alone all, of the evidence 
supporting the trial court's finding of bad faith, or the underlying findings of fact 
that they lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their actions in defending the 
case by testifying falsely at trial. Accordingly, this Court should summarily affirm 
the trial court's finding of bad faith. See United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35 
6
 Indeed, a review of the Lloyds' Request for Transcript reveals that the 
Lloyds limited their request to only a portion of the trial court's ruling following 
trial, and the hearing on the Gallegos' Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
Establishment of Costs. (See R. at 393). 
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at U 27; Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312; Benvenuto. 1999 UT at 11 13; Young v. 
Young, 979 P.2d 338, 345 (Utah 1999). 
3. The Trial Court's Finding of Bad Faith is Well-Supported 
in the Record and is Not Clearly Erroneous. 
To find that a party acted in bad faith, the trial court must find that one or 
more of the following factors existed: (1) the party lacked an honest belief in the 
propriety of their actions; (2) the party intended to take unconscionable advantage 
of others; or (3) the party intended to or acted with the knowledge that the 
activities in question would hinder, delay or defraud others. Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 
316; citing Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. 
In addition to its findings that the Lloyds3 testimony was not credible, the 
trial court made express findings supporting its finding of bad faith. (See 
Addendum C at 111114-18 and 29). Specifically, the trial court found that: 
the Lloyds failed to act in good faith in their defense of 
this action. In particular, the Lloyds lacked an honest 
belief in the propriety of their actions and, ultimately, 
took advantage of Plaintiffs5 property rights of which they 
knew or should have known. 
(Id. at 11 29) (emphasis added). This plain language reveals that the trial court 
expressly found at least one of the Cady factors, namely, that the Lloyds lacked an 
21 
honest belief in the propriety of their actions in defending this case. See Cady, 671 
P.2d at 151. The court's finding of bad faith is supported by this finding alone.7 
In addition, the trial court made further findings supporting its finding that 
the Lloyds lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their testimony (See 
Addendum C at 1TO 14-18). Specifically, that the Lloyds knew that they were 
testifying falsely in their defense. In this regard, the trial court found: 
[t]he Lloyds were negligent in going forward with the 
construction of their home as staked because the Lloyds 
knew, or should have known, that the staking and 
subsequent construction of their home violated the 
requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan. 
The Lloyds disregarded the requirements of the Lot 106 
Site Plan to their considerable advantage. 
Motive existed for the Lloyds to ignore the requirements 
of the Lot 106 Site Plan. This motive included: 1) 
avoiding increased excavation costs associated with the 
excavation required by the Lot 106 Site Plan; 2) an 
improved view with southern exposure; and 3) 
constructing a relatively flat driveway rather than the 
7
 As with the trial court's findings of fact that the Lloyds asserted their 
defense in bad faith and that they testified falsely in their defense, the Lloyds failed 
to marshal the evidence to challenge the trial court's finding of fact that they lacked 
an honest belief in the propriety of their actions in defending the case. (See 
Lloyds3 Br.) Thus, this Court should affirm the trial court's finding of this Cady 
indicator of bad faith. See United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35 at II 27; 
Vakarce, 961 P2d at 312; Benvenuto, 1999 UT at 11 13; Young v. Young, 979 
P.2d338, 345 (Utah 1999). 
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average 8.5% slope contemplated by the Lot 106 Site 
Plan. 
(Addendum C at 1111 16-18) (emphasis added). These findings, coupled with the 
court's findings that the Lloyds testified falsely in their defense and, hence, lacked 
an honest belief in the propriety of their actions in defending the case, 
demonstrates that the trial court's finding of bad faith is well supported in the 
record and not clearly erroneous. 
J\ ihe Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Lloyd's Defense 
was Without Merit. 
1. The Lloyds3 Defense is Void of Any Basis in Fact. 
A defense is without merit for purposes of § 78-27-56 if it is "of litde 
weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 
2000 UT 102, 1f 22, 20 P.3d 868 (citing Cady, 671 P.2d at 151) (emphasis 
added). The trial court correcdy concluded that the Lloyds' defense was without 
merit because it is void of any basis in fact. 
The Lloyds' defense to this action was that they were unaware of their 
encroachment at the time they constructed their home on a portion of the Galiegos' 
lot because they were unaware that the construction of their home was not 
proceeding according to the site plan approved by Salt Lake County (Addendum 
C at If 14.) After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence presented at 
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trial, the trial court found that the physical markers and topography of the Lloyds5 
building site were such that it was essentially impossible for a sentient being to not 
realize that the house was being built contrary to the official site plan approved by 
Salt Lake County. (Addendum C at H1f 15-18.) Specifically the court found: 
[t]here were several physical markers required by the Lot 
106 Site Plan which never materialized during the 
construction of the Lloyd's home. These markers 
included: 1) the presence of a 12 to 14 foot high 
embankment on the west side of the Lloyd Home; 2) the 
presence of two large retaining walls on both the west 
and east side of the driveway; and 3) an average grade on 
the driveway of 8.5% with a maximum grade of 10%. 
The absence of these markers provided unmistakable 
notice to the Lloyd's that their home was being 
constructed in the wrong location. 
(Addendum C at 11 15) (emphasis added). In other words, there is absolutely no 
basis in fact for the Lloyds3 defense that they were unaware that the construction of 
their house was not proceeding in the correct location as defined by the Salt Lake 
County approved site plan.8 Accordingly the trial court correctly determined that 
the Lloyds5 defense of this action was without merit because it was void of any 
basis in fact. Warner, 2000 UT 102 at 1f 22. Indeed, the absence of facts in 
8
 In their brief, the Lloyds assert that their "defenses were based on facts in 
the record.53 (Lloyds5 Br. at 18.) The Lloyds, however, fail to cite to any facts in 
the record in support their defense. (See Lloyds5 Br.) This failure is telling of the 
lack of any factual basis in the record for the Lloyds5 defense of this action. 
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support of their defense necessarily required the Lloyds to testify falsely in order to 
fabricate a defense. 
2. The Lloyds Testified Falsely i )efense. 
Testifying falsely ccis not a legitimate mode of defense35 and supports a 
finding that a defense is without merit. Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315. Indeed, the 
Utah Supreme Court has made clear that cca finding that a party has attempted to 
avoid liability by testifying falsely will support a decision to award attorney fees if 
combined with a finding of bad faith.55 Id (citing Topik, 739 E2d at 1104). 
In Valcarce, the counter claim plaintiff alleged that the counterclaim 
defendant, Mr. Valcarce, damaged an irrigation canal and a series of damming 
devices on the canal. Id at 310. In response, Mr. Valcarce testified at trial that he 
did not damage the irrigation canal or its dams. Id The trial court, however, 
"found his testimony to be incredible5 and concluded that Paul Valcarce did indeed 
damage the canal.55 Id Based on this finding, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the trial court correcdy determined that Mr. Valcarce5s defense of the case was 
without merit, hL; see also Topik, 739 P.2d at 1104 (holding trial court correcdy 
awarded attorneys fees under § 78-27-56 because the defendant attempted to avoid 
liability by testifying falsely). 
25 
In the instant case, the trial court correcdy determined that the Lloyds3 
defense of the case was without merit because the court specifically found—as in 
Valcarce—that the Lloyds3 testimony in support of their defense was incredible. 
(Addendum C at 11 14.) In support of their defense, the Lloyds testified that they 
were unaware that the construction of their home was not proceeding according to 
their approved site plan, and that they relied on other professionals to properly 
stake their home and notify them that their home was not located according to the 
approved site plan. (Addendum C at II 14.) 
The trial court, however, specifically found: 
[t]he Lloyd's assertion that they were unaware of the fact 
that the construction of their home was not proceeding 
according to the Lot 106 Site Plan and, hence, that they 
were not aware of any potential encroachment onto Lot 
102, is not credible. Likewise, the Lloyd's assertion that 
they relied upon other professionals to properly stake 
their home or notify them that their home was not 
located according to the Lot 106 Site Plan, is not 
credible. 
(Id.) (emphasis added). The trial court further found during the hearing on the 
Gallegos' Motion for Attorney's Fees that Mr. Lloyd came into court "and testified, 
in my opinion, totally without credibility." (Addendum D at p. 35) (emphasis 
added). Thus, under Valcarce, the trial court correctiy determined that the Lloyds' 
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defense was without merit because they attempted to avoid liability by testifying 
falsely9 See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315. 
The Lloyds contend that their defense cannot be deemed without merit 
because the "trial court reduced the amount of actual damages claimed by Gallegos 
by more than forty percent and completely dismissed the Gallegos3 claim for 
punitive damages." (Lloyd's Br. at 18.) In support of this contention, the Lloyds 
rely heavily on MiVida Enterprises v. Steen-Adams, et al., 2005 UT App 400, 122 
P.3d 144. This reliance, however, is misplaced. 
In MiVida, this court reversed the award of attorney's fees under § 78-27-56 
because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of bad faith to satisfy 
the second prong of the statutory test. Id. at 11 IX. hi reaching tins conclusion, the 
Court specifically noted that cc[b]ecause we determine that bad faith was lacking in 
this case, we need not address whether the Colorado action was without merit." 
IdL at 11 18, n. 7. Thus, the case hardly stands for the proposition that a reduction 
in damages claims negates a trial court's finding of a meritiess defense under § 78-
27-56, because the Court never addressed the issue. 
9
 Although the Lloyds failed to challenge the trial .court's finding that they 
testified falsely in their defense, even if they had, as established in § I. A. 2. supra, 
the Lloyds failed to meet their burden to marshal the evidence in support of such a 
challenge. See § I. A. 2. supra. 
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Instead of referring to an analysis under § 78-27-56, the Lloyds5 reliance on 
MiVida centers on a strained reading of the Court's ruling under Rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically the Lloyds3 attempt to equate a 
trial court's finding of a merkless defense under § 78-27-56 with a determination 
of whether an appeal is frivolous under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. (Lloyd's Br. at 19.) The Lloyds, however, fail to cite to any authority, 
from Utah or elsewhere, that supports the proposition that a determination that a 
defense is without merit under § 78-27-56 is analogous to a determination that an 
appeal is frivolous under Rule 33; no such authority exists. (See Lloyds' Br. at 
§11.) 
Indeed, the applicable authority in Utah regarding the award of attorney's 
fees under § 78-27-56 stands for the exact opposite proposition: although a 
defendant may prevail on some claims, this success does not negate a trail court's 
finding that the defense was without merit under § 78-27-56. In Coalville City v. 
Lundgren. 930 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court specifically held 
that the cc[d]efendant's measure of success on a collateral issue does not preclude an 
assessment of bad faith attorney fees" under § 78-27-56; see also Topik, 739 P.2d 
at 1104 (upholding attorney fees award under § 78-27-56 against defendant where 
"defense was partially in bad faith" because defendant testified falsely about one of 
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several defenses). This Court's holding in Coalville City is also in accord with 
other jurisdictions5 holdings under similar statutes. See e ^ 5 Wean Water, Inc. v. 
Sta-Rite Indus., Inc.. 686 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding 
attorney's fees award under similar bad faith statute where plaintiffs technical 
success on breach of contract claim did not negate groundless fraud claim made in 
bad faith). 
In summary, the trial court held that the Lloyds5 defense of the case was 
without merit because the Lloyds took the stand and testified falsely in an effort to 
convince the trial court that construction of their home on the Gallegos5 lot was an 
innocent mistake resulting from the conduct of a deceased, hapless and underpaid 
surveyor. The trial court specifically found this testimony totally incredible, and the 
attempt to claim ignorance and blame others, without merit. In addition, the 
Lloyds did not even attempt to challenge the trial court5s findings of fact which 
directly support its conclusion that the Lloyds5 defense of the case was without 
merit. Thus, under Valcarce, the trial court's determination that the Lloyds5 
defense was without merit follows a fortiori from its finding of fact that their 
testimony was not credible. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AS CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. 
The Gallegos are well aware of the limitations of Utah law regarding 
recovery of attorneys fees as damage in tort cases. It is for this reason that counsel 
suggested the alternative statutory basis to support the award at the time the trial 
court was issuing its ruling. (Addendum D at p. 7.) Nevertheless, this case 
presents a compelling circumstance for allowing recovery of fees as an element of 
damage because without initiation and prosecution of this action, the Gallegos3 
property would have remained wholly unmarketable indefinitely (Addendum C at 
1I1f 24 and 27.) 
As the trial court found, "the Lloyds initiated no action to address or resolve 
their trespass." (Id. at 11 29.) The trial court further found that: 
[a]s a direct consequence of the actions and/or omissions 
of the Lloyds, the Gallegos were required to obtain 
counsel and pursue this action in order to resolve the 
boundary encroachment, adjust the lot boundaries, and 
render Lot 102 usable and marketable. 
(14) 
This circumstance is not unlike the situation where title to real property 
conveyed by warranty deed is encumbered and the grantee has to incur fees to 
remove the encumbrance and quiet tide. Utah courts have long allowed recovery 
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of attorneys fees in such a circumstance, reasoning that they constitute a necessary 
cost incurred to render their property marketable and free from defects. Van Cott 
v. Tacklin, 63 Utah 412, 422, 236 P. 460, 463-64 (1924); Creason v. Peterson, 24 
Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 403 (1970); Holmes Dev. Co., LLC v. Cook. 2002 UT 
38,1139, 48P.3d895. 
From a logical standpoint, it is difficult to rationalize allowing an award in 
the deed context and deny that same award where the damage is real and 
comparable in both instances and the only difference is the hoary dichotomy of tort 
vs. contract. This case is an appropriate vehicle for the court to move beyond the 
tort/contract distinction and allow recovery of fees where the defendants5 conduct 
requires the expenditure of fees to remedy a title problem which renders plaintiffs5 
real property unmarketable. 
The Gallegos request their attorney's fa % and costs associated with the 
instant appeal. 
It is well-established that ccwhen a party who received attorney fees below 
prevails on appeal, the party is also entitied to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.55 
Pearson v. Lamb: 2005 UT App 383, 11 15, 121 P.3d 717; see also Vakarce, 961 
P.2d at 319; Utah Dept. of Social Services, 806 P.2d at 1197. "Moreover, an 
appeal brought from an action which is properly determined to be in bad taith is 
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necessarily frivolous under Utah R. App. P. 33." Utah Dept. of Social Services, 
806P.2dat l l97. 
In the instant case, the trial court correctly awarded attorney's fees under 
§ 78-27-56 and as consequential damages of the Lloyds5 trespass. In addition, in 
support of its award of fees under § 78-27-56, the trial court properly determined 
that the Lloyds acted in bad faith in their defense of this action. (See Addendum C 
at 11 29). Indeed, the Lloyds wholly failed to properly challenge the finding of bad 
faith, or the findings of fact upon which the bad faith determination was premised. 
(See Lloyds5 Br. at § II). Accordingly, the Gallegos hereby request their attorney's 
fees and costs associated with the instant appeal pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents the "poster child55 for a § 78-27-56 award of fees. When 
people come into our courts and testify falsely, our system of jurisprudence is 
threatened and sometimes malfunctions. The Gallegos believe that the sound 
public policy behind § 78-27-56 is a desire by the legislature to discourage and 
indeed punish those who enter its courts on the premise of false testimony and 
meritless action. 
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The Lloyds expropriated for their own benefit, the prime topographic feature 
of the Gallegos5 lot, came to court and lied about it, and then quibbled over the 
damages and fees the Gallegos were required to incur in order to attempt to 
remedy the Lloyds3 intentional trespass. Sound public policy and fundamental 
fairness dictate that the judgment below be affirmed in all respects and that the 
Gallegos be awarded their fees on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this <X~. day of July 2007. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
135374.1 
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Tab A 
ADDENDUM A 
I :i Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-56 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action in i 
fense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under 
Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under 
the provisions of Subsection (1). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92, 
§ 1. 
ANALYSIS 
Appeal. 
—Frivolous appeal. 
Award. 
—Distinguishing between fees. 
Discretion of court. 
Essential elements. 
Fees properly awarded. 
Fees properly denied. 
Findings. 
Good faith by insurer. 
Hearing. 
Paralegal services. 
Quiet title action. 
- State of mind. 
"Without merit" and "good faith/' 
—Bad faith not found. 
Cited. 
Appeal. 
The "without merit" determination is a ques-
tion of law, and therefore the appellate court 
will review it for correctness. Jeschke v. Willis, 
811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
A finding of bad faith is a question of fact and 
is reviewed by the appellate court under the 
"clearly erroneous" standard. Jeschke v. Willis, 
811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
—Frivolous appeal. 
An appeal brought from an action which is 
properly determined to be in bad faith is nec-
essarily frivolous under Utah R. App. P. 33. 
Utah Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 
1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Award. 
—Distinguishing between fees. 
An award of attorney fees must distinguish 
between those fees incurred in connection with 
successful and unsuccessful claims, as must the 
evidence submitted by the prevailing party, or 
the reviewing court will be precluded from 
making an independent determination. Val-
carce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). 
Discretion of court. 
It is within the trial court's discretion to 
determine bad faith under this section. Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 
1989). 
An award of attorney fees premised on a 
finding of bad faith is, to an extent, a matter 
within the discretion of the trial court, and 
appellate deference is owed to the trial judge 
who actually presided over the proceeding and 
has first-hand famiharity with the litigation. 
Utah Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 
1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Essential elements. 
This section clearly states that the court 
shall award attorney fees to the prevailing 
party only if it determines (1) that the action is 
without merit and (2) that the action was 
brought in bad faith. If the court finds both 
elements of the statute, then it has no discre-
tion and must award reasonable attorney fees 
to the prevailing party. Watkiss & Campbell v. 
Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
Three requirements must be met before the 
court shall award attorney fees: (1) the party 
must prevail, (2) the claim asserted by the 
opposing party must have been without merit, 
and (3) the claim must not have been brought 
or asserted in good faith. Hermes Assocs. v. 
Park's Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). , 
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Fees properly awarded. 
Where defendant's pattern of ignoring court 
orders caused plaintiff to take legal action on 
several occasions to force defendant's compli-
ance, plaintiff was properly awarded attorney 
fees. Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied, 939 P.2d 683 
(Utah 1997). 
Trial court did not err in awarding attorney 
fees based on findings that plaintiffs' claims 
and defenses were without merit because the 
facts were contrary to evidence and bad faith 
was shown by plaintiffs' pursuit of claims hav-
ing no other apparent reason than to harass 
defendants and drive up the costs of litigation. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 
1998). 
An award of attorney fees was appropriate 
where plaintiff's action in the trial court had no 
basis in law, and thus was without merit. 
Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, 20 
R3d 868. 
Fees properly denied. 
Because, absent a voluntary agreement be-
tween the disputing parties, a quiet title action 
is the only legally binding way to settle a 
boundary dispute and because it could not be 
said that landowner acted in bad faith by 
refusing to sign quitclaim deed sent by attorney 
retained by adjacent land owners until after 
the adjacent landowners had filed suit, trial 
court's denial of adjacent landowners' claim for 
attorney fees under this section was proper. 
Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
Defendant's request for attorney fees was 
denied where plaintiff's claims were not shown 
to be without merit and not brought in bad 
faith, and defendants failed to marshal the 
evidence regarding bad faith. Wardley Better 
Homes & Garden v. Cannon, 2001 UT App 48, 
21 P.3d 235. 
Findings. 
Under this section, a trial court must make 
findings that: (1) the claim or claims were 
"without merit," and (2) the party did not act in 
good faith. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
R2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
This section does not require written findings 
on the bad faith issue. If a court finds bad faith 
but in its discretion limits or awards no attor-
ney fees, Subsection (2)(b) does, however, re-
quire written findings. Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
Good faith by insurer. 
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing by an insurer does not show 
the bad faith necessary for an award under this 
section. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 
P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
An insurer is obliged to assess the black-
letter law in the jurisdiction in which the claim 
arises; this obligation to properly assess the 
law extends to the legal assertions a party and 
its counsel may make in litigation. Lieber v. 
ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr, Inc., 2000 UT 90, 15 
P.3d 1030. 
Hearing. 
This section does not require a trial court to 
hold a hearing to determine if a party has been 
"stubbornly litigious" or if an action was with-
out merit. Canyon County Store v. Bracey, 781 
P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
Paralegal services. 
Services provided by a paralegal were prop-
erly included in the court's award of attorney's 
fees. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 
1993). 
Quiet title action. 
Although ruling was made that attorney fees 
are not recoverable in an undisputed quiet title 
action, award of attorney fees to landowners, 
pursuant to their counterclaim against adja-
cent landowners on the basis that the adjacent 
landowners acted in bad faith by pursuing a 
second cause of action for attorney fees after 
obtaining a quitclaim deed from landowner for 
the disputed property, could not be supported 
under either Subsection (1) of this section or 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11, because when adjacent 
landowners filed their claim there was no clear 
prohibition on the recovery of attorney fees in 
undisputed quiet title actions and finding was 
not made as to bad faith on part of the adjacent 
landowner. Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
State of mind. 
The existence of bad faith, which must be 
shown under this section, is a subjective ques-
tion of state of mind. Canyon County Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
"Without merit" and "good faith." 
A frivolous action having no basis in law or 
fact is "without merit," but is nevertheless in 
"good faith" as long as there is an honest belief 
that it is appropriate, and as long as there is no 
intent to hinder, delay, defraud or take advan-
tage of another. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 
(Utah 1983). 
To prove that a claim is "without merit," the 
party asserting an award of attorney fees must 
first demonstrate that the claim is "frivolous" or 
"of little weight or importance having no basis 
in law or fact." Second, the party must prove 
that the plaintiff's conduct in bringing the suit 
was lacking in good faith. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 
P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
There was no remand, even assuming that 
defendants had asserted their defense in bad 
faith, when nothing in the record supported a 
F>',\<) 
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conclusion that the defense was without merit. 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 R2d 527 
(Utah 1993). 
The point at which plaintiff should have 
mitigated her damages is a legitimate issue 
that can hardly be characterized as frivolous or 
as having no basis in law or fact. Broadwater v. 
Old Republic Sur., 854 R2d 527 (Utah 1993). 
—Bad faith not found. 
County's condemnation of the plaintiff's 
property in two separate legal actions, when 
the subject property was always within the 
scope of the original plans to build a county 
airport, was not done in bad faith. Board of 
County Comm'rs v. Ferrebee, 844 P.2d 308 
(Utah 1992). 
Respondent was not entitled to attorney fees 
on appeal where the trial court specifically 
found that the petitioner brought her action for 
modification of a divorce decree believing that 
she was legally entitled to some of the respon-
dent's military retirement benefits, and the 
respondent did not challenge those findings. 
Childs v. Callahan, 993 P.2d 244 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999). 
Plaintiff's claim for attorney fees failed under 
this section because defendant offered no de-
fense, so the court could not determine that the 
defense to the action was without merit. Faust 
v. Kai Techs., Inc., 2000 UT 82, 15 P.3d 1266. 
It was not bad faith for town residents to seek 
judicial review after having failed in their ad-
ministrative challenge to a zoning ordinance; 
thus, an award of attorney fees was improper. 
Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 2001 UT App 
55, 21 P.3d 245. 
Because the trial court's grant of attorney 
fees was based on its finding that a claim had 
been pursued in bad faith, when that claim was 
later found to have merit, the grant of attorney 
fees w'as also reversed. Sittner v. Schriever, 
2001 UT App 99, 22 R3d 784. 
Cited in Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 
(Utah 1987); Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P2d 
306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); DeBry v. Occiden-
tal/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank, 754 P.2d 60 (Utah 
1988); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 R2d 163 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Cascade''Energy & Metals 
Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990); 
Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
851 P2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Pennington 
v. Allstate Ins. Co, 973 R2d 932 (Utah 1998); 
Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33,44 P.3d 781; Rohan 
v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109,^ 46 P.3d 753. 
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Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or \ 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved 
in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) 
of this rule/
 t * 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made 
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court,'with citations 
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on 
appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such 
an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is 
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the 
brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is 
bound separately, the*-'addendum shall contain a table of contents. The 
addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of 
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the 
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appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter 
service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance 
to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of 
the court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is 
dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the adden-
dum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the 
appellant. 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
names, of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured 
person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
,(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party 
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties 
otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to 
file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in 
combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the 
issues raised in the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of 
Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of 
Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of 
Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant. 
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(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which 
shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the 
court for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that 
exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the 
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good 
cause for granting the motion. Amotion filed at least seven days before the date 
the brief is due or seeking five or fewe*- additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before 
the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be 
accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion 
is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional 
pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or 
denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies ^shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court, may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1,1995; April 1, 1998; 
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006; November 
1, 2006.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 24 
(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts 
have long held. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 
1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 
R2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully 
appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate 
counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Attor-
neys] must extricate [themselves] from the cli-
ent's shoes and fully assume the adversary's 
position. In order to properly discharge the 
[marshalling] duty..., the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced 
at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists/" ONEIDA/SLIC, v. 
ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 
872 R2d 1051,1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alter-
ation iri original) (quoting West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 R2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
App. 1991)). See also State ex rel. M.S. v. 
Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); 
Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 
1989); State v. Moore, 802 P2d 732, 738-39 
(Utah App. 1990). 
The brief must contain for each issue raised 
on appeal, a statement of the applicable stan-
dard of review and citation of supporting au-
thority. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amend-
ment deleted Subdivision (k) pertaining to brief 
covers. 
The 2004 amendment added the last sen-
tence in Subdivision (a)(9). <; 
The April 2006 amendment substituted "this 
paragraph" for "this rule" in the last sentence in 
Subdivision (g), deleted "and may be exceeded 
only by permission of the court. The court shall 
grant reasonable requests, for good cause 
shown" from the end of Subdivision (b), and 
added Subdivision (h), making related changes. 
The 2006 amendment rewrote Subdivision 
(g). 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutional arguments. 
Contents. 
—Argument. 
—Inadequate. 
—Inappropriate language. 
—Standard of review. 
—Statement of facts with citation to record. 
Failure to file. 
—Defective appeal. 
Issues not raised at trial. 
Noncompliance with rule. 
Preservation of issues. 
Properly documented argument. 
Reply brief. 
Sanctions. 
Cited. 
Constitutional arguments. 
In order to make an argument for an innova-
tive interpretation of a state constitutional pro-
vision textually similar to a federal provision, 
the following points should be developed and 
supported with authority and analysis. First, 
counsel should offer analysis of the unique 
context in which Utah's constitution developed 
with regard to the issue at hand. Second, coun-
sel should demonstrate that state appellate 
courts regularly interpret even textually simi-
lar state constitutional provisions in a manner 
different from federal interpretations of the 
United States Constitution and that it is en-, 
tirely proper to do so in our federal system. 
Third, citation should be made to authority 
from other states supporting the particular 
construction urged by counsel. State v. Bobo, 
803 P.2d 1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Contents. 
A brief must contain some support for each 
contention.' State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 
(Utah 1989); State v. Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Extensive quotations from numerous case 
authorities and treatises, while helpful, cannot 
substitute for the development of appellate 
arguments explicitly tied to the record. West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Appellant's brief was clearly deficient under 
the provisions of this rule because it failed to 
set forth a coherent statement of issues and the 
appropriate standard of review for each issue 
with supporting authority, the "issues" where 
listed did not correlate with the substance of 
the brief, the statement of the case not only 
omitted reference to the course of proceedings 
and disposition in the trial court, but failed to 
provide a statement of the relevant facts prop-
erly documented by citations to the record, and 
defendant's "argument" did not identify any 
error by the trial court, refer to the facts or the 
record, or cite applicable authority, much less 
provide any meaningful factual or legal analy-
sis. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
It is improper to use an addendum to incor-
porate argument by reference that should be 
included in the body of the brief. State v. Jiron, 
866 P.2d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Appellate brief that set forth little legal anal-
ysis on issue presented, did not specifically 
discuss how trial court erred, did not attempt to 
marshal the evidence, and presented no cita-
tions to record failed to conform to require-
ments of this rule. Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 
1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Briefs must contain reasoned analysis based 
upon relevant legal authority. An issue is inad-
equately briefed when the overall analysis of 
the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of 
research and argument to the reviewing court. 
State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,474 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 44, 72 P.3d 138. 
—Argument. 
Appellants' brief, containing less than a sin-
gle page of assertions and no citations to the 
record, no legal authorities, and no analysis 
whatsoever, was not in compliance with this 
rule, which requires the brief of an appellant to 
contain an argument. Christensen v. Munns, 
812 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Court declined to consider argument that 
was not adequately briefed. See State ex rel 
C.Y. v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Defendant's failure to brief the applicability 
of a common law construction (the good faith 
exception to the warrant requirement) under 
the Utah Constitution at the trial court level 
and his subsequent failure to develop any 
meaningful argument thereunder did not per-
mit higher appellate review of these state con-
stitutional claims, but left the analysis to pro-
ceed solely under federal constitutional law. 
State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 857 R2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
Because appellant failed to provide adequate 
legal analysis and legal authority in support of 
his claims, his assertions did not permit appel-
late review. Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 
197 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Snow Flower 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Snow Flower, Ltd., 2001 
UT App 207, 31P.3d576. 
Because the state failed to meet its briefing 
duty under Subdivision (a)(9) as to the search-
incident-to-arrest argument regarding circum-
stances involving defendant convicted of un-
lawful possession of a controlled substance, the 
Court of Appeals declined to address the argu-
ment. State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
Implicitly, Subdivision (a)(9) requires not just 
bald citation to authority but development of 
that authority and reasoned analysis based on 
that authority. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 
(Utah 1998). 
While failure to cite to pertinent authority 
may not always render an issue inadequately 
briefed, it does so when the overall analysis of 
the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of 
research and argument to the reviewing court. 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998). 
Brief that purported to present three argu-
ments, supported by five points, but that failed 
to cite legal authority and impermissibly 
shifted the burden of analysis to the reviewing 
court did not satify the requirements of this 
rule. Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, 995 
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P.2d 14, cert, denied, 4 R3d 1289 (Utah 2000). 
Summary judgment for defendants was ap-
propriate where plaintiff failed to provide any 
reasons, as required by Subdivision (a)(9), to 
support the contention that disputes of mate-
rial of fact existed. Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UT 
App30, 18 P 3d 1137. 
This rule requires not just bald citation to 
authority but development of that authority 
and reasoned analysis based on that authority 
in order for an appellate issue to be adequately 
briefed. Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT 
App 379, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 80 P.3d 546. 
Because brief failed to articulate why a dis-
trict court erred in dismissing a county from a 
lawsuit or any theory as to how the county was 
liable for a patient's suicide, there was no 
reason to address an appeal from the dismissal. 
Davis v. Cent. Utah Counseling Ctr., 2006 UT 
52, 147 P 3d 390. 
—Inadequate. 
Brief listing a disjointed array of facts se-
lected because they aided appellant's cause, 
containing legal analysis that was little more 
than a conclusory statement unsupported by 
analysis or authority, and that failed to cite 
properly to the record, a failing that required 
the court to research and review the volumi-
nous record itself to uncover the factual under-
pinnings of defendant's assertions, was inade-
quate. State v. Green, 2005 UT 9,518 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 30, 108 P.3d 710. 
—Inappropriate language. 
Derogatory references to others or inappro-
priate language of any kind has no place in an 
appellate brief and is of no assistance in at-
tempting to resolve any legitimate issues pre-
sented on appeal. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 
(Utah 1986). 
—Standard of review. 
The standard of review requirement in Sub-
division (a)(5) should not be ignored. The pur-
pose of the requirement is to focus the briefs, 
thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency in 
the processing of appeals. Christensen v. 
Munns, 812P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
—Statement of facts with citation to« 
record. 
The Supreme Court need not, and will not, 
consider any facts not properly cited to, or 
supported by, the record. Uckerman v. Lincoln 
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978). 
The Supreme Court will assume the correct-
ness of the judgment in a criminal trial if 
counsel on appeal does not comply with the 
requirements as to making a concise statement 
of facts and citation of the pages in the record 
where they are supported. State v. Tucker, 657 
P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). 
If a party fails to'make a concise statement of 
the facts and citation of the pages in the record 
where those facts are supported, the court will 
assume the correctness of the judgment below. 
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987); Steele v. Board of Review of 
Indus. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
Where the plaintiff appealed the issue of the 
trial court's allowing lay opinion regarding the 
supposed reasonableness of a defendant's driv-
ing conduct, but the defendant failed to specif-
ically cite any such testimony in the record, the 
Supreme Court refused to address the issue 
under this rule. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425 
(Utah 1998). 
Where defendant argued that he was not 
advised, at the time of his prior convictions for 
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), of 
the possibility of enhancement if defendant was, 
again convicted in the future, and argued that 
the state had not provided written evidence to 
prove that defendant was so advised, it was 
defendant's burden, not the state's, to provide 
citations to the record to support his arguments 
that he was not so advised. State v. Marshall, 
2003 UT App 381, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 81 
P3d 775, cert, denied, 87 R3d 1163 (Utah 
2004), cert, denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004). 
Failure to file. 
—Defective appeal. 
Where defendant was convicted of operating 
a motor venicle without insurance, and at-
tempted to file his appeal pro se, but failed to 
file a brief or submit a transcript of the record, 
there was no reversible error presented which 
would permit the appellate "court to' reverse the 
judgment. State v. Hansen, 540 R2d 935 (Utah 
1975). 
Issues not raised at trial. 
An appellate court may address an issue 
raised for the first time on appeal if appellant 
establishes that the trial court committed plain 
error, if there are exceptional circumstances, or, 
in some situations, if a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is raised on appeal. State 
v. Irwin, 924 R2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, 
denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
The exceptional circumstances concept 
serves to assure that manifest injustice does 
-hot result from the failure to consider an issue 
on appeal. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P2d 146 (Utah 
1997). 
The fact that liberty is at stake is not suffi-
cient basis for deviating from the general rule 
requiring the appellant to raise the issue at 
trial,in order to argue it on appeal. State v. 
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, 
denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
The trial counsel's failure to object to the 
prosecution's apparently improper remarks at 
sentencing, even in conjunction with the expi-
ration of the time within which to make a 
timely motion to withdraw the plea, is not a 
substantial enough procedural anomaly to in-
voke the exceptional circumstances concept 
which would allow appellant to raise an issue 
on appeal for the first time. State v. Irwin, 924 
P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 
P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
Because plaintiff had not properly raised 
three issues in the trial court that he raised on 
appeal, and because he argued plain error or 
manifest injustice for the first time in his reply 
brief, the court refused to review the three 
issues. Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,17 P.3d 
1122. 
Rule 24 U J l i i n IVUJUJU. , 
Because plaintiff raised issues for the first 
time on appeal concerning breach of contract 
and battery claims, and did not argue plain 
error or exceptional circumstances in the dis-
missal of those claims, the court declined to 
address the issues and affirmed the grant of 
summary judgment thereon. Walter v. Stewart, 
2003 UT App 86, 67 P.3d 1042, cert, denied, 73 
P.3d 946 (2003). 
Noncompliance with rule. 
The Supreme Court declined to address any 
of the arguments raised in a brief that failed to 
meet almost every requirement of this rule. 
MacKay v. Hardy, 973 R2d 941 (Utah 1998). 
The court declined to consider the merits of 
the issues briefed where defendant's brief failed 
to cite relevant legal authority or provide any 
meaningful analysis. State v. Shepherd, 1999 
UT App 305, 989P.2d503. 
Defendant's brief did not adequately set forth 
an argument as required by Subdivision (a)(9) 
of this rule. However, because the court was not 
obligated to strike or disregard a marginal or 
inadequate brief, in the interests of justice, the 
court chose chose to address defendant's argu-
ments. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d 
1108. 
In defendant's appeal of convictions for ter-
roristic threat and threatening an elected offi-
cial, his failure to provide adequate legal anal-
ysis or authority to support his contentions on 
appeal did not permit any meaningful review 
by the appellate court; his brief failed to comply 
with the requirements or purpose of this rule 
and his convictions were accordingly affirmed. 
State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, 47 P3d 107. 
Appellate court temporarily remanded an 
appeal to the trial court for appointment of new 
counsel for defendant because the brief filed by 
defendant's appellate counsel was wholly inad-
equate for its failure to contain a statement of 
grounds for seeking review of an issue not 
preserved in the trial court and defendant 
raised Fourth Amendment claims that were not 
preserved for appeal. Ogden City v. Stites, 2002 
UT App 357, 58R3d865. 
Where a party failed to marshal the evidence 
and properly brief the issues that it raised on 
appeal and instead indicated that it could not 
marshal the evidence because the court had 
imposed a 100-page limit which forced it to rely 
on its addenda to satisfy its marshaling burden, 
and additionally, where it failed to attempt to 
meet its burden of demonstrating that the trial 
jcourt's findings of fact were clearly erroneous, 
which was the issue raised, the appellate court 
declined to review the issue. Aspen wood, L.L.C. 
v. C.A.T., L.L.C, 2003 UT App 28, 466 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7, 73 P.3d 947, cert, denied, 72 P3d 
685 (2003). 
In action by investors relating to their losses 
in a failed investment venture, because the 
investors failed to brief the dismissal of five of 
their causes of action, they waived the oppor-
tunity to appeal the dismissal. Coroles v. Sabey, 
2003 UT App 339, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 79 P.3d 
974. 
Defendant, convicted of rape and aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child, did not specifically set 
forth hearsay statements he challenged on re-
view nor did he provide any relevant facts for 
review. Accordingly, the court could not con-
sider the argument as it failed to comply with 
this rule. (Unpublished decision.) State v. 
Timsanico, 2005 UT App 158. 
In a partition action, because tenant in com-
mon failed to marshal the evidence to support 
its argument that a mine company, the other 
tenant in common, had waived its right to 
partition, the appellate court assumed that the 
trial court's findings were supported by the 
evidence. United Park City Mines Co. v. 
Stichting Mayflower Mt. Fonds, 2006 UT 35, 
140 P.3d 1200. 
Preservation of issues. 
Plaintiff's First Amendment argument was 
not properly preserved for appeal because it 
failed to meet the requirements of specificity 
and citation to authority. In his motion for 
summary judgment and his motion in limine, 
plaintiff made a generalized argument that his 
conduct towards defendant was protected by 
his First Amendment right to petition the gov-
ernment; however, in neither motion did plain-
tiff cite any relevant authority that supported 
that proposition, and he did not argue that 
defendant was required to prove that plaintiff's 
statements were made with "actual malice." 
Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, 511 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 16, 102 P.3d 774. 
Properly documented argument. 
Brief that was filled with burdensome, emo-
tional, immaterial and inaccurate arguments 
did not set forth a properly documented argu-
ment as required by this rule; therefore the 
court disregarded it. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 
746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Where a city failed to demonstrate by way of 
statute, ordinance, case law, or other authority 
how failure to file a site plan could defeat or 
invalidate an otherwise legal nonconforming 
use, the court rejected the city's contention 
regarding the nonconforming use. Hugoe v. 
Woods Cross City, 1999 UT App 281, 988 P2d 
456. 
The plaintiff's general statement that the 
trial court's finding that a lessee placed a sign 
for the purpose of "forestalling competitive ac-
tivity" supported a violation of the antitrust 
statute was insufficient to persuade the appel-
late court that a violation occurred. U.P.C., Inc. 
v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 1999 UT App 303, 990 
P.2d 945. 
Reply brief. 
As a general rule, an issue raised initially in 
a reply brief will not be considered on appeal, 
although the court, in its discretion, may de-
cided a case upon any points that its proper 
disposition may require, even if first raised in a 
reply brief. Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 
611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980). 
Observation by the state in a footnote that 
defendant had not raised a particular issue in 
the trial court or in his opening brief on appeal 
did not constitute a "new matter" entitling 
defendant to brief the issue in his reply brief. 
State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, 6 P3d 1116. 
Sanctions. 
Trial court properly awarded attorney's fees 
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to defendant as a sanction against plaintiff R2d 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Reeves v. 
whose brief was extraordinarily deficient. The Steinfeldt, 915 R2d 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); 
brief w a s bereft of any organizational coher- State v. Bryant, 965 R2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 
ericy or structure and the arguments were for 1998); SNtate v. Fisher, 972 P.2d 90 (Utah Ct. 
the most part unsupported by any specific legal App. 1998); State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 
citation or analysis. Nipper v. Douglas, 2004
 186> 5 p>3d 1222; Holmstrom v. C.R. England, 
UT App 118, 497 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 90 P.3d
 I n C j 2000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d 281; State v. 
649, cert, denied, 94 P.3d 929 (Utah 2004). Helmick, 2000 UT 70, 9 P.3d 164; Gorostieta v. 
Cited in Weber v. Snyderville West, 800 P.2d Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 17 P.3d 1110; Ellis v. 
316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Hoyt, 806 Swensen, 2000 UT 101,16 P.3d 1233; Rackley v 
P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State ex rel. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 2001 UT 32, 23 P.3d 
M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1022; F.R. v. State, 2001 UT App 66, 21 P.3d 
1991); State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d 604 (Utah Ct. 680; Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board of 
App. 1991); English v. Standard Optical Co., Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, 38 P.3d 291; 
814 P.2d 613 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Hinckley v. State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, 57 R3d 977, cert. 
Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); denied, 537 U.S. 863,123 S. Ct. 257,154 L. Ed. 
Larson v. Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 2d 105 (2002); Weber County v. Chambers, 2001 
1316 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Davis, 821 UT 53, 28 P.'3d 694; State v. Waldron, 2002 UT 
P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Garza, 820 App 175, 51 P.3d 21; State v. Werner, 2003 UT 
P.2d 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Johnson-Bowles App 268, 478 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 76 P.3d 204; 
Co. v. Department of Commerce, 829 P.2d 101 Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282,479 Utah Adv. 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Middlestadt v. Indus. Rep. 6, 76 P.3d 716; Save Our Schools v. Board 
Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); of Educ, 2005 UT 55, 122 P.3d 611; Chang v. 
Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah Ct. App. Soldier Summit Dev., 2003 UT App 415, 488 
1993); Barney v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 885 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 82 P.3d 203. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 605 et 
Review § 540 et seq. seq. 
Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem. 
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad litem representing a minor 
who is not a party to the appeal may be filed only by leave of court granted on 
motion or at the request of the court. Parties to tjhe case may indicate their 
support for, or opposition to, the motion. A motion for leave shall identify the 
interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus 
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable. Except as, all parties otherwise 
consent, an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem shall file its brief within the 
time allowed the party whose position as to affirmance or reversal the amicus 
curiae or guardian ad litem will support, unless the court for cause shown 
otherwise orders. A motion of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem to 
participate in the oral argument will be granted when circumstances warrant 
in the court's discretion. 
(Amended effective April 1, 2004.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amend- in the first sentence and added the second 
ment deleted "if accompanied by written con- sentence, 
sent of all narties. or" after "may be filed only" 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate 
Review § 540. 
Rule 26. Filing and service of briefs. 
(a) Time for service and filing briefs. Briefs shall be deemed filed on the date 
of the postmark if first-class mail is utilized. The appellant shall serve and file 
a brief within 40 days after date of notice from the clerk of the appellate court 
pursuant to Rule 13. If a motion for summary disposition of the appeal or a 
motion to remand for determination of ineffective assistance of counsel is filed 
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HIED DISTRICT mum 
Third Judicial District 
JUL t 9 2006 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW GALLEGOS and JOAN 
GALLEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
JAMES LLOYD; JULIE LLOYD; 
MOUNTAIN AMERICA FEDERAL CREDIT 
UNION, a Utah non-profit corporation; 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, as nominee for COUNTRYWIDE 
HOME LOANS, INC., a New York corporation, 
dba AMERICA'S WHOLESALE LENDER; J. 
SCOTT LUNDBERG, trustee; and CAREY 
JOHANSEN dba LAND DESIGN, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 040916534 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the above-entitled Court on June 27th 
and 28th, 2006, with the Honorable John Paul Kennedy, District Judge, presiding without a 
jury. Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel, George A. Hunt and 
Stephen T. Hester of Williams & Hunt. Defendants James and Julie Lloyd were present 
and represented by their counsel, T. Richard Davis of Callister, Nebeker & McCullough. 
Defendant Mountain America Federal Credit Union was present and represented by its 
counsel William G. Wilson of Scalley & Reading, and Defendant Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc. was present and represented by its counsel, Darren K. Nelson of Parr, 
Waddoups, Brown & Gee. Witnesses were sworn and counsel elicited testimony from the 
witnesses, presented documentary exhibits and argued their respective positions to the 
Court. The parties then submitted the case for decision and the Court issued a ruling from 
the bench at the close of trial. Consistent with that ruling and in support thereof, the Court 
now enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiffs, Andrew and Joan Gallegos (the "Gallegos"') are record owners 
of real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more specifically described as 
Lot 102 Emigration Oalcs Subdivision, Phase III, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108 ("Lot 102"). 
2. Defendants James and Julie Lloyd (the "Lloyds") are the record owners and 
residents of real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more specifically 
described as Lot 106 Emigration Oaks Subdivision, Phase V, commonly known as 5982 
Pioneer Fork Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108 ("Lot 106"). 
2 
3. Defendant Mountain American Federal Credit Union ("Mountain America") 
is a Utah non-profit corporation and a federally chartered credit union with its principal 
place of business in West Jordan, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. ("MERS") is a 
Delaware corporation licensed to do business in Salt Lake County, Utah and is acting as 
nominee for Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., a New York corporation, dba America's 
Wholesale Lender ("Countrywide"). 
5. Lots 102 and 106 share a common property line. The common property line 
is situated on top of a ridge. 
6. In 1993, the Gallegos purchased Lot 102 of the Emigration Oaks 
Subdivision, Phase III, in order to build their dream home sometime in the future. 
7. In June of 1996, Defendants James and Julie Lloyd purchased Lot 106 of the 
Emigration Oaks Subdivision, Phase V. The topography of Lot 106 was a slope elevating 
from the east property line up to the west property line shared with Lot 102. 
8. In an effort to improve Lot 106, the Lloyds engaged the services of Mr. 
James Carroll to provide architectural drawings of a home to be built on Lot 106. 
9. Mr. Carroll provided detailed drawings of the Lloyds future home, including 
a site plan, to the Lloyds and submitted the drawings and site plan to Salt Lake County to 
gain approval to begin construction on Lot 106 (the "Lot 106 Site Plan"). Mr. Carroll 
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denies inspecting the construction of the Lloyd Home to ensure compliance with the 
requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan, although he visited the property five or six times 
during construction. 
10. No evidence was presented regarding whether Defendants Mountain America 
and Countrywide (who hold deeds of trust against Lot 106) inspected the construction of 
the Lloyd home to ensure compliance with the Lot 106 Site Plan, nor was any argument 
made that they had a duty to do so. 
11. Salt Lake County approved the Lot 106 Site Plan in or about August 1996 
and the Lloyds began construction of their home (the "Lloyd Home5') immediately 
thereafter. 
12. Mr. Lloyd acted as the general contractor overseeing the construction of the 
Lloyd Home. Mrs. Lloyd assisted Mr. Lloyd in his duties as general contractor by 
reviewing and paying invoices of subcontractors. 
13. The Lloyd Home was neither staked nor constructed according to the 
requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan. The Lloyd Home was staked on Lot 106 in such a 
way that a portion of the home was built upon, and in fact encroached upon, Lot 102. 
14. The Lloyd's assertion that they were unaware of the fact that the construction 
of their home was not proceeding according to the Lot 106 Site Plan and, hence, that they 
were not aware of any potential encroachment onto Lot 102, is not credible. Likewise, the 
4 
Lloyd's assertion that they relied upon other professionals to properly stake theire home or 
notify them that their home was not located according to the Lot 106 Site Plan, is not 
credible. 
15. There were several physical markers required by the Lot 106 Site Plan which 
never materialized during the construction of the Lloyd's home. These markers included: 
1) the presence of a 12 to 14 foot high embankment on the west side of the Lloyd Home; 
2) the presence of two large retaining walls on both the west and east side of the driveway; 
and 3) an average grade on the driveway of 8.5% with a maximum grade of 10%. The 
absence of these markers provided unmistakable notice to the Lloyd's that their home was 
being constructed in the wrong location. 
16. The Lloyds were negligent in going forward with the construction of their 
home as staked because the Lloyds knew, or should have known, that the staking and 
subsequent construction of their home violated the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan. 
17. The Lloyds disregarded the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan to their 
considerable advantage. 
18. Motive existed for the Lloyds to ignore the requirements of the Lot 106 Site 
Plan. This motive included: 1) avoiding increased excavation costs associated with the 
excavation required by the Lot 106 Site Plan; 2) an improved view with southern exposure; 
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and 3) constructing a relatively flat driveway rather than the average 8.5% slope 
contemplated by the Lot 106 Site Plan. 
19. In July 1997, the Lloyds finished construction of their home on Lot 106. As 
a result of the Lloyd's actions and/or omissions, the home encroached upon Lot 102, well 
beyond the minimal set back and side yard requirements required by the Lot 106 Site Plan. 
20. In disregarding the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan, the Lloyds 
intended to build their home in such a way that resulted in the unlawful invasion of the 
Gallegos" property. 
21. As a result of the Lloyds3 disregard for the requirements of the Lot 106 Site 
Plan, the Lloyd Home is fifteen feet higher in elevation than contemplated by the Lot 106 
Site Plan and sits laterally over forty feet west of its designated location. 
22. The ultimate siting of the Lloyd Home interfered with the Gallegos3 view 
from Lot 102. 
23. As a result of the Lloyds5 encroachment on to Lot 102, the Gallegos were 
unable to build a home on Lot 102 pursuant to architectural designs they had previously 
developed and purchased. 
24. As a further result of the Lloyds' encroachment on to Lot 102, the Gallegos 
were unable to determine when they would be able to obtain a building permit for Lot 102 
and commence construction. Due to the indeterminable delay in commencing construction 
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on Lot 102, the Gallegos purchased Lot 14 in Phase I of the Emigration Oaks Subdivision 
and proceeded with a new home design. 
25. As a direct consequence of Mr. Lloyd's actions and/or omissions, the Gallegos 
incurred architectural and storage fees that they would not have otherwise incurred, and 
paid taxes on property being occupied and utilized by the Lloyds. 
26. The amount of the damages suffered by the Gallegos as a direct consequence 
of the trespass of the Lloyds, are as follows: 
Architectural Fees $39,500.00 
Taxes 2,753.31 
Storage Fees 2,300.00 
Lost Property Value 27,500.00 
TOTAL $72,053.31 
27. The encroachment and damages for taxes will continue until the boundary 
can be adjusted and approved by the Emigration Oaks Homeowners Association and any 
and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters. The correct approach to 
adjustment is the approach suggested by the Gallegos5 expert witness, Mr. Jerry Webber, 
viz., transfer a 38 foot wide strip along Lot 102fs eastern boundary to the Lloyds in 
consideration of the $27,500 in damages noted in 11 25, above. Such adjustment will 
require the services of a licensed surveyor and the Lloyds should pay all such costs, together 
with any and all fees and other costs associated with adjusting the respective property 
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boundaries and obtaining approval from the Emigration Oaks Homeowners Association 
and any and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters. 
28. Moving or demolishing the Lloyd home would involve economic waste and 
therefore the boundary adjustment mechanism described above is the most equitable 
method of resolving the encroachment. 
29. As a direct consequence of the actions and/or omissions of the Lloyds, the 
Gallegos were required to obtain counsel and pursue this action in order to resolve the 
boundary encroachment, adjust the lot boundaries, and render Lot 102 usable and 
marketable. The Lloyds initiated no action to address or resolve their trespass. In addition, 
the Lloyds failed to act in good faith in their defense of this action. In particular, the 
Lloyds lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their actions and, ultimately, took 
advantage of Plaintiffs' property rights of which they knew or should have known. Their 
defense to the Gallegos' claims was without merit. The amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees 
incurred should be established by motion pursuant to Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
30. The Court did not find by clear and convincing evidence that the actions 
and/or omissions of the Lloyds were the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward 
the rights of the Gallegos. 
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FROM THE foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter 
jurisdiction over this action. 
2. Venue is properly laid in this District. 
3. The Gallegos were, at all relevant times, in actual possession of Lot 102. 
4. The Lloyds trespassed on to Lot 102 by causing their home to be built in 
such a fashion and location that it encroaches on Lot 102. 
5. Acting as the general contractor in building his own home, Mr. Lloyd owed 
the Gallegos a duty to situate the location of his home with reasonable care and to ensure 
that his home was constructed according to the Lot 106 Site Plan. 
6. Mr. Lloyd breached that duty by staking the Lloyd Home in such a way as to 
cause the home to be situated and constructed so that it encroached upon Lot 102. 
7. The Lloyd's knew or should have known that their home was not staked or 
constructed according to the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan but proceeded with 
construction anyway. 
8. It was foreseeable that, as a result of Mr. Lloyd's breach of his duty to 
properly stake his home and ensure that it was constructed according to the requirements of 
the Lot 106 Site Plan, the Gallegos would suffer damages. 
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9. The Lloyd's actions and/or omissions caused the Gallegos to be damaged. 
10. Mr. Lloyd acted unreasonably in proceeding with construction of the Lloyd 
Home in violation of the Lot 106 Site Plan. 
11. It was reasonable for the Gallegos to pursue the design and construction of a 
new home on Lot 14 in the Emigration Oaks Subdivision as a result of the Lloyds5 
encroachment on Lot 102. 
12. As a result of the Lloyds5 encroachment upon Lot 102, the Gallegos should 
recover damages consisting of: 1) architectural fees in the amount of $39,500.00; 2) taxes 
paid on Lot 102 in the amount of $2,753.31 and continuing until property boundary is re-
drawn; 3) storage fees of $2,300.00; and 4) diminution in value of Lot 102 in the amount 
of $27,500.00. 
13. As a further result of the Lloyds5 encroachment upon Lot 102, the Gallegos 
suffered consequential damages in the form of attorneys fees which should be recovered. In 
addition, based on the documentary evidence and witness testimony presented at trial, the 
Lloyds5 defense of this action was without merit and not asserted in good faith. 
Accordingly, attorney's fees should be awarded to Plaintiffs under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-56, the amount to be established by motion under Rules 54 and 73 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
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14. As a further result of the Lloyds5 encroachment on to Lot 102, the property 
boundary between Lot 102 and Lot 106 must be re-drawn in accordance with the expert 
report of Mr. Jerry Webber. The new property boundary should run parallel with the 
existing property boundary and should include approximately 7,800 square feet of Lot 102. 
In the event that the property added by the boundary adjustment contains any scrub oak, 
the conveyance should provide a perpetual easement encompassing that scrub oak thereby 
preventing its destruction and/or removal. 
15. The fees and costs associated with preparing the new property boundary and 
obtaining approval of the new property boundary from the Emigration Oaks Homeowners 
Association and any and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters, should be 
paid by the Lloyds. 
16. No award of punitive damages should be made in this matter. 
17. Defendants Mountain America and Countrywide are not culpable in this 
matter and are not responsible for any of the damages suffered by Plaintiffs. Accordingly, 
they should be dismissed from this action. 
18. The Court should retain jurisdiction over this matter until the property 
boundary adjustment is completed and all costs and fees associated therewith have been paid 
in full. 
19. The Court should enter a Judgment and Decree consistent herewith. 
11 
DATED this i t day 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
WILLIAM G. WILSON 
fh,(Yf/\ /CM&^ 
DARREN K. NELSON 129443 1 
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ADDENDUM D 
Transcript of Ruling Only on 6/28/06 and Motion on Attorney's Fees on 11/2/06 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW GALLEGOS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES LLOYD, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 040916534 PR 
Appellate Case 20061135-SC 
With Keyword Index 
June 28,2006 
November 2,2006 
RULING ONLY 
MOTION ON ATTORNEY'S FEES 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Page 1 
9 
By. 
FILED DISTBIST COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 3 1 2007 
JM. SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - JUNE 28, 200 6 
2 JUDGE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY PRESIDING 
3 (Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
5 ^PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT - RULING ONLY* 
6 P R O C E E D I N G S 
7 THE COURT: Well, I think as our discussion focused 
8 here, the problem appears to be that no one seems to be able 
9 to say how long the process of being able to get a building 
10 permit would have taken. The testimony was that Gallegoses 
11 were under some sort of unique family pressures that prompted 
12 them to need to act. I find that their decision to buy a new 
13 lot and proceed with the house on that location, on Location 
14 14, was a reasonable decision given the facts. 
15 I find also that Mr. Lloyd was certainly negligent 
16 in going forward with the construction on his home in the 
17 location in which it was ultimately situated which I find in 
18 violation of the approved site plan. 
19 I find that if the lot were, in fact, staked as it 
20 was built, it was not reasonable for him to rely on that 
21 staking. There were too many other indications to indicate 
22 that it was correct. I would find that he either knew or 
23 should have known that the house was in the wrong place but 
24 he proceeded anyway. 
25 I find that he - that motivations existed to build 
1 where he did and that those included saving money and 
2 excavation costs, improving the view, and access and general 
3 layout of the lot, 
4 I find that the house, as built, is about 15 feet 
5 higher than it should have been if it had been built 
6 according to the approved site plan. And I find that that 
7 ultimate citing of the house, of the Lloyds, in fact, 
8 interfered with their view, particularly with respect to the 
9 upper floors of the house. And I think if you look at the 
10 drawings you'11 see that the upper floors went up as high as 
11 20 some feet and I don't think a photo from a 12-foot level 
12 covers that. In addition, I don't think, especially in the 
13 winter time, I don't think that any of the trees would cover 
14 the Lloyd's home even from the lower floors. 
15 So, I find that defendant's actions have caused 
16 plaintiffs damages in a number of areas. I think with 
17 respect to the architect's billings, I find that they appear 
18 to be reasonable and necessary in all respects except I don't 
19 believe that the conversion drawings were justified. I think 
20 there could have been a decision made to just go ahead and 
21 junk the original drawings and go forward with new ones and I 
22 think they would have saved, as I recall, approximately 
23 $11,000, $12,000. 
24 In addition, I saw some other costs relating to the 
25 boundary issues which didn't appear to me to be legitimate in 
1 terms of timing, and also, there was some legal costs tacked 
2 on. I wasn't quite sure why those would be justified, so I 
3 did not allow that. But I felt that $39,500 worth of 
4 architect's costs and fees were justified. I felt that the 
5 taxes of $2,753.31 through the date calculated were justified 
6 and would continue until the trespass is abated in some 
7 fashion. We'll talk about that in a minute. 
8 With respect to storage, I also agreed with the 
9 defense counsel on that one. It was hard for me to see all 
10 of that storage as being legitimate and my feeling was that 
11 it would be reasonable to incur some of that expense, but not 
12 all of it, and so I've - and plus I think some of it was 
13 shown to not be appropriate in the testimony. So, on 
14 storage, I order $2,300. 
15 With respect to the diminution of value, we had a 
16 range, as I recall it went from a number in Exhibit 15, as I 
17 recall was 35 8, and I think Mr. Cook's number was 
18 significantly lower than that. I tried to do some rough 
19 calculated on a basis of a square-footage number and I came 
20 up with something like $19,800. I felt that Mr. Cook's 
21 estimates and rationale were not as persuasive or as credible 
22 as Mr. Webber's, but, nonetheless, I thought some of Mr. 
23 Webber's were a little overstated. So, my feeling is with 
24 respect to the diminution in value - and this is based on an 
25 assumption that we would have a slice taken out of the 
1 Gallegos' property equivalent to 7,800 feet. The diminution 
2 in value would be $27,500. 
3 Now, I found that the lenders are not culpable in 
4 this matter. Maybe if they had somebody who was looking over 
5 the documents and actually going out and checking the 
6 property, some of these problems could have been avoided, but 
7 I don't think there's any evidence to show that that's the 
8 practice and, for what it's worth, my personal experience is 
9 that they don't usually do that anyway. So, I'm not going to 
10 find them liable or responsible for any of these damages, 
11 that the damages that I found are going to be the 
12 responsibility of the Lloyds. 
13 The thing that I struggle with the most is how 
14 anyone can say, given these facts and my findings, that what 
15 the Lloyds did wasn't either reckless disregard of the rights 
16 of the plaintiffs, gross negligence or willful, a willful act 
17 and I think to make such a finding, I need clear and 
18 convincing evidence. I'm not going to make such a finding, 
19 but I can tell you that it's by the slimmest of margin that 
20 I'm not making such a finding. 
21 I do feel that the actions of the Lloyds have 
22 resulted in consequential damages to the Gallegoses, and in 
23 this case, I think those consequential damages include 
24 attorney's fees. I wouldn't find that in every case, but in 
25 this case I think it's clear that they should have known that 
1 their disregard of all of these indicators, could have and 
2 probably would have resulted in serious problems which would 
3 have in turn resolved in, in all likelihood, in extensive 
4 litigation costs. So, as a result, I'm finding as 
5 consequential damages the attorney's fees incurred by the 
6 plaintiffs in this case. 
7 And I'm not going to award punitive damages. 
8 Now, with respect to the property boundary, it 
9 would seem to me that we need to redraw the boundary for this 
10 property. As I've indicated, I think 7,800 square feet, and 
11 I would accept the opinion of Mr. Webber that to make that 
12 line either irregular or at an angle would end up as a 
13 disservice to this particular piece of property and would 
14 negatively impact its value. So, I would require that line 
15 to run parallel to the existing property line and as number 
16 feet over that it would need to be to equal that 7,800 square 
17 feet. I don't know what the exact number of feet is, I think 
18 it was on the order of 38 feet or thereabouts. 
19 The costs for preparing the new boundary and 
20 getting it approved through the homeowners' association, as 
21 well as through many local authorities, like the county, are 
22 to be borne by Lloyds. In the event that that property line, 
23 the new property line, goes through any existing scrub oak I 
24 would place a perpetual easement protecting that scrub oak as 
25 well, so that if some of that scrub oak ends up on his part 
1 of the line, he will not be able to go cut it down. 
2 I'm going to leave the issues with respect to the 
3 septic tank to further resolution in the normal course 
4 through the homeowners' association and if the parties, if 
5 whoever ends up owning that lot wants to work something out, 
6 fine, but otherwise, I'm not going to require anything 
7 specific on that. 
8 I'm going to ask you, Mr. - well, I think it's 
9 probably better for the plaintiff, for you, Mr. Hunt, to 
10 prepare the order in this matter but I want you to do it in 
11 close cooperation with Mr. Davis-
12 MR. HUNT: Sure. 
13 THE COURT: - so that you get his input. I think 
14 both of you are extremely capable, competent, reasonable 
15 attorneys. And I think - I want to complement you both on 
16 the job that you've done here in this trial over the last two 
17 days. I think you both have done an excellent job. 
18 And I don't know how much in terms of punitive 
19 damages you've saved your client, Mr. Davis, but conceivably 
20 a lot by your arguments today. I think they've been good 
21 arguments and they've been persuasive on that issue as well 
22 as the other issues and I would complement each of you on 
23 what you presented. So, I would ask you both to work 
24 together and try to work out something that would make sense. 
25 Anything further from either side? 
1 MR. HUNT: Got a question, Your Honor. The award of 
2 attorney's fees and you're calling that consequential 
3 damages, not either allowed by statute or by contract, but 
4 just as consequential damages; is that what I understand? 
5 THE COURT: Well, I guess I have two choices. I 
6 guess I could find punitive, a need for punitive damages here 
7 and award them in that context, or I could put them in as 
8 consequential damages on the other hand and it would seem to 
9 me to be, it would save further hearing on a punitive damage 
10 award. As I say, by the slimmest of margin, I have not 
11 awarded punitive damages here, but I think consequential 
12 damages are appropriate. 
13 MR. HUNT: Your Honor, if I may speak to that. I 
14 think also the Court has the latitude to find that the 
15 position advanced by the Lloyds in defense of the client is 
16 not credible and that gives the Court latitude under 78-27-
17 56. 
18 THE COURT: Well, and I would - I would so find 
19 that. I think that that's - warrant that. 
20 MR. HUNT: We can submit that by motion and 
21 affidavit in dealing with the amount or-
22 THE COURT: Again, have Mr. Davis look that over 
23 carefully. 
24 MR. HUNT: Sure. 
25 THE COURT: Anything further? 
1 MR. HUNT: No, thank you, Your Honor. 
2 MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Then we will be in recess, 
4 I (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 I -c-
8 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - NOVEMBER 2, 2006 
2 JUDGE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY PRESIDING 
3 (Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
5 For the Plaintiffs: GEORGE A. HUNT 
6 For the Defendants: T. RICHARD DAVIS 
7 P R O C E E D I N G S 
8 THE COURT: We're here on the Gallegos versus Lloyd 
9 matter. Do you want to state your appearances? 
10 MR. HUNT: George Hunt for the plaintiffs, Andy and 
11 Joan Gallegos. 
12 MR. DAVIS: Richard Davis on behalf of Defendants 
13 Lloyd. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. We are convened today to discuss 
15 the plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees which has been 
16 objected to by Mr. Davis on behalf of his clients, the 
17 Lloyds. So, Mr. Davis, why don't you tell me why you think 
18 that the petition should be denied? 
19 MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Would you like me 
20 to stand? 
21 There are actually three issues here and I think we 
22 began to discuss these at the very end of the trial after the 
23 Court delivered its findings from the bench, and we discussed 
24 the issue of how the attorney's fees can be awarded, whether 
25 they be consequential damages or what and the questions were 
1 made and the Court was fairly direct in saying, "I would like 
2 these to be consequential damages," notwithstanding the 
3 issues that were raised. Mr. Hunt raised the issue of, that 
4 he could substantiate them under the bad faith statute. 
5 Since that time and pursuant to the rule, once the 
6 attorney's fee issue then is brought to the court to be 
7 approved, as far as numbers, then it is our responsibility to 
8 object to the same. The objections are very similar to the 
9 ones that we've had before, and are more specifically set out 
10 in our memorandum. 
11 The first issue is that under a bad faith defense, 
12 under the - well, even before that, under the American Rule, 
13 the general American Rule, attorneys' fees are awarded when 
14 they're authorized by either statute or by contract in the 
15 parties. We don't have a contract between the parties. The 
16 statute here is, that is being identified by the plaintiffs 
17 is the Bad Faith Statute which says that "if a claim or a 
18 defense is asserted without merit and in bad faith then 
19 reasonable attorneys' fees can be awarded." We, under that 
20 statute, we believe that is inapplicable here and the reason 
21 is is because really this case had two different claims. 
22 The first claim was for actual damages incurred by 
23 the Gallegoses because of the encroachment on the property. 
24 From the very beginning there was no contest as to the 
25 encroachment. As soon as we discovered the encroachment was 
10 
1 there, there were probably not even a $1,000 of damages which 
2 had been incurred by that time. After that point it was a 
3 contest as to how much should be awarded to those damages. 
4 As you remember in the trial brief when the damages 
5 were finally liquidated, the plaintiffs were asking somewhere 
6 around $127,000. In fact, the Lloyds strongly and vigorously 
7 defended that action based on each of those discreet elements 
8 of damage and the Court was persuaded, at least, in some of 
9 those such that when the judgment was rendered it was at 
10 $72,000 - about 56 percent of the amount claimed. We believe 
11 that shows that, at least, as far as the elements of damage 
12 and the amount of damage that the defense was not assertive 
13 without merit, but was asserted with merit, and was necessary 
14 for the trial to go forward as being defended. 
15 The second part of that was the claim for punitive 
16 damages which was brought, as the Court may remember, several 
17 weeks before trial and was contested by the Lloyds, but we 
18 did go forward and the plaintiffs spent considerable amount 
19 of time eliciting evidence at trial as to the intent of the 
20 parties in the, in causing the encumbrance, the Court's 
21 specific findings, and we've gone back and reviewed the 
22 Court's findings, and the Court said the Court fails to find 
23 by a, oh, I can't remember-
24 THE COURT: Clear and convincing. 
25 MR. DAVIS: Clear and convincing, I'm sorry, the 
11 
1 clear and convincing evidence that the Lloyds were guilty of 
2 wanton or willful disregard of the rights of the Gallegoses 
3 and that was a specific finding. 
4 Therefore, the Lloyds were successful in defending 
5 that action. I believe because of the fact that we were 
6 successful in all of the one claim and significant in part on 
7 the other claim, the wrongful defense statute just doesn't 
8 stand. It doesn't work in this matter. Besides that, the 
9 bad faith that was being contested, when there is an issue 
10 for the bad faith attorney's fees is not in the conduct of 
11 the parties prior to the litigation, but it's in the conduct 
12 of the parties and their attorneys during the time of 
13 litigation. And I did bring a couple of cases with me that I 
14 can hand to the Court if the Court would like to look at 
15 them. One of them is Tenth Circuit case and the other is a 
16 Utah Supreme Court statute that says exactly that, that's the 
17 bad faith that we look at under the Bad Faith Statute. 
18 The second prong of the assertion for the award of 
19 attorney's fees is the one which the Court specifically 
20 stated in the findings and fact, and that was - that it would 
21 be a consequential damage caused by the encumbrance or the 
22 trespass of the Lloyds on the Gallegos' property. This is a 
23 - that is a new principle that we could not find nor could 
24 the Gallegoses find support for in the law so far in the 
25 State of Utah. It is not a majority position. If the Court 
12 
1 goes that way, it will be making new law. There have been 
2 and in the case which was cited by both parties in the famous 
3 footnote where the Court - Utah State Court says that, the 
4 Supreme Court says that "we don't make this decision, but we 
5 do note that we have allowed consequential damages on, at 
6 least, two other situations." And those situations, one had 
7 to do with an employment case and the other one had to do 
8 with... 
9 THE COURT: It was an insurance case. 
10 MR. DAVIS: An insurance case, that's correct, where 
11 they had to go out and incur significant fees. I also on 
12 the, in the interest of fair disclosure, Your Honor, I did 
13 make another exhaustive research to see if there was any 
14 other times when the Court could exert its equitable powers 
15 to award attorney's fees, and I found two other instances 
16 where the Court has such a power. 
17 One is before the Public Service Commission. There 
18 is a Utah State Supreme Court case where the Court says, 
19 "You, plaintiff, have incurred these attorney's fees that not 
20 only benefit your client but a whole class of people, 
21 therefore, we're going to award attorney's fees against the 
22 regulated industry in favor of you." 
23 And the other one was in the distribution of a 
24 trust estate where one of the beneficiaries brought the 
25 action which benefitted all of the other defendants - the 
13 
1 beneficiaries, some of which were antagonistic to the lawsuit 
2 and the Court said, "in the interest of equity, we should 
3 have all of the attorneys' fees, or the attorneys' fees, 
4 shared by all the beneficiaries." I have not found, anywhere, 
5 where a tort action has been able to been the basis for an 
6 award of attorney's fees as consequential damages. 
7 The one issue that I did see as far as the contract 
8 is concerned, is if - and there was an insurance, there was a 
9 construction contract where the attorney's fees were awarded, 
10 but not in the litigation. It was in the litigation that 
11 happened on the outside, for instance, if, in clearing off 
12 liens which had come against the property prior to or 
13 concurrently with the lawsuit against the contractor. That 
14 being said, what that would really mean is if the Gallegoses 
15 were required to obtain legal assistance or other 
16 professional assistance, not in the context of this lawsuit 
17 but in the other context in remedying the problem 
18 (inaudible), those fees or costs would be appropriately 
19 assessed against the Lloyds as consequential damages, but not 
20 the litigation expenses in this piece of litigation. 
21 The last part of the argument goes to the Bill of 
22 Cost. I did not particularize my objections to the cost 
23 because that was like throwing chairs off of the Titanic. 
24 But, if we do not have, the-
25 J THE COURT: I think the metaphor is straightening 
14 
1 the chairs on the Titanic. 
2 MR. DAVIS: Straightening the chairs off the, I 
3 appreciate that - straightening the chairs. But the issue is 
4 is if the attorney's fees, and if Mr. Hunt's request for all 
5 the attorney's fees and all the costs are awarded, then it 
6 doesn't make any difference. If it doesn't, then we're 
7 really looking at a Bill of Costs, and the Bill of Costs 
8 under the Frampton case in the State of Utah it says that, 
9 yes, deposition costs and fees, if the depositions helped 
10 defer the case, should be awarded, and we agree to that. 
11 Also, costs that are to the Court or for service of process. 
12 But for $2,700 of copying charges and fax charges for expert 
13 witness fees, which were specifically stricken, in the 
14 Frampton case, those are not appropriate costs to be awarded 
15 against the losing party in a lawsuit. Only those costs 
16 which should be awarded for - to the Court or for witnesses 
17 for the statutory amounts. 
18 THE COURT: All right. So, if you do not prevail on 
19 your first two points, how much of the cost bill do you 
20 object to? 
21 . MR. DAVIS: We object to $8,805.08. Those would be 
22 $2,796 of copy charges; a title report of $600; appraisal of 
23 $350; $500 rock, a rock wall estimate, mediation fee of $731; 
24 of $3,827 of the expert witness. I don't believe those were 
25 appropriate charges or costs under the rule to be assessed 
15 
1 against my client. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Let me hear from 
3 Mr. Hunt and I may have some questions. 
4 Go ahead, Mr. Hunt. 
5 MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Judge. 
6 MR. HUNT: Thank you, Your Honor. I think the only 
7 thing that's at issue here today is the amount of the 
8 attorney's fees and costs. Entitlement was ruled upon by the 
9 Court at the end of trial. Findings of fact and a judgment 
10 were entered on July 19th, awarding of fees and making 
11 findings supporting that award, leaving only open the amount 
12 of the fees to be addressed by motion. There was no Rule 59 
13 motion filed to alter or amend those findings of fact or to 
14 attack the judgment, or to attack the finding of entitlement. 
15 Furthermore, there was no timely objection filed to 
16 the memorandum of costs and disbursement. Under Rule 54, you 
17 have five days to file an objection to the costs. No such 
18 objection was timely filed. So, they waived their right to 
19 challenge either the entitlement or the costs and really the 
20 only issue that should be properly before the Court here is 
21 the amount of the fees, and they have not filed a contrary 
22 affidavit challenging the amount of the fees that we've 
23 placed before the Court. So we find ourselves here with 
24 counsel now trying to attack both the entitlement issue as to 
25 the fees and the entitlement issue to the costs where the 
16 
1 time for doing so has already passed. 
2 Now, that having been said, I think it's really 
3 important because the findings that are in the case have been 
4 entered by the Court and are essentially final, make some 
5 very specific factual findings that clearly provide the 
6 support for a 78-57-56 attorney's fee finding. For example, 
7 Finding 15, the Court says, "There were several physical 
8 markers required by the Lot 106 site plan which never 
9 materialized during the construction of the Lloyd's home. 
10 These markers included the presence of a 12- to 14-foot high 
11 embankment on the west side of the home, presence of two 
12 large retaining walls on both the west and east side of the 
13 driveway, and an average grade of the driveway of 8.5 percent 
14 with a maximum grade of 10 percent. The absence of these 
15 markers provided unmistakable notice to the Lloyds that there 
16 home was being constructed in the wrong location." 
17 And then in finding of fact Number 29, the Court 
18 finds, "As a direct consequence of the actions and/or 
19 omissions of the Lloyds, the Gallegos were required to obtain 
20 counsel and pursue this action in order to resolve the 
21 boundary encroachment, adjust the lot boundaries, and render 
22 Lot 102 useable and marketable. The Lloyds initiated no 
23 action to address or resolve the trespass. In addition, the 
24 Lloyds failed to act in good faith in their defense of this 
25 J action. And particularly, the Lloyds lacked an honest belief 
17 
1 in the propriety of their actions and ultimately took 
2 advantage of plaintiffs' property rights of which they knew 
3 or should have known. Their defense to the Gallegos' claims 
4 goes without merit. The amount of the plaintiffs' attorney's 
5 fees incurred should be established by motion pursuant to 
6 Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." 
7 So, it seems to me that the defendants find 
8 themselves in a situation where they failed to challenge 
9 findings of fact and conclusions of law that have been 
10 entered by the Court pursuant to the rules, which require 
11 Rule 59 motion within ten days of entering the judgment. 
12 They didn't do that. Instead, they waited until we file 
13 seeking the establishment of the amount of our fees and then 
14 they try to challenge both entitlement as to fees and costs 
15 and, of course, the time to do either of those has already 
16 passed. And even if it hadn't, Your Honor, we believe that 
17 under the circumstances of this case, what we're asking for 
18 is proper. The cost that he's questioning were costs to 
19 prepare exhibits for the expert testimony that was necessary 
20 in order to determine how to resolve the boundary 
21 encroachment problem and finally, the deposition costs that 
22 were used in cross-examining the witness, which, although 
23 they weren't allowed in the Frampton case, deposition costs 
24 are within the discretion of the trial court to grant. 
25 So, our position is (a) that they've waived the 
18 
1 right to challenge entitlement to either the fees or costs, 
2 either the award of attorney's fees or costs, and (b) there 
3 is no evidence before the Court regarding the amount except 
4 my affidavit and so it stands unchallenged as well. 
5 And finally, I'd like to remark on this, two 
6 things. One is that at the end of the trial, the Court 
7 stated on the record that it was about that far from awarding 
8 the punitive damages and it was quite upset at how the 
9 evidence had come in and the obvious fact that the Lloyds had 
10 ignored and gone ahead with, essentially, intentionally and 
11 built their house on someone else's property. 
12 And secondly, is that in the judgment which was 
13 entered on July 19th, the Court ordered the Lloyds to 
14 forthwith proceed to resolve the boundary issue - and they 
15 haven't done it. They haven't - there's no filings with the 
16 county to amend the plat to fix the judgment and no petition 
17 before the homeowners' association to get that approved and 
18 so we're now at five, four or five months, down the road, and 
19 it's the same pattern that was observed prior to trial where 
20 the Lloyds have got their pound of flesh and they're just 
21 sitting on it and my clients are sitting there with an 
22 unmarketable lot, so we've got that problem as well. Thank 
23 you, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you a,couple questions, 
25 Mr. Hunt. 
19 
1 MR. HUNT: Sure. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Davis argues that the court's 
3 references in the past, not this Court but the Supreme Court, 
4 the awarding damages under the statute, you have to 
5 demonstrate that there was a lacking and an honest belief in 
6 the propriety of the actions and/or activities in question. 
7 And Mr. Davis says that those activities in question have to 
8 come after the filing of the lawsuit and that's where the bad 
9 faith has to be present in order to get damages. Comment on 
10 that for me, would you? 
11 MR. HUNT: Well, I'm not - I'm not familiar with the 
12 case he's talking about. The research that we did indicated 
13 that during the conduct of a trial, if a witness testifies in 
14 such a fashion that their testimony is utterly incredible, 
15 which the Court found Mr. Lloyd's testimony to be, that is, 
16 in effect, bad faith. That's a lack - that's a lack of merit 
17 to the defense because you're essentially trying to lie in 
18 order to defend your case. And so, in the Katie vs. Johnson 
19 case that we've quoted to the Court, the court specifically 
20 found that that was sufficient to support a finding of 
21 attorney's fees under the statute because-
22 THE COURT: So you assert, regardless of how 
23 reprehensible their conduct was before the lawsuit, the fact 
24 that he comes into court and makes statements which are 
25 incredible in court, constitutes bad faith sufficient to form 
20 
1 the basis of -
2 MR. HUNT: Exactly, but that theirs - that's exactly 
3 the Katie vs. Johnson case that I quoted in my brief. I 
4 mean, the Court found that that evidence to not only a 
5 defense without merit, but a lack of good faith, and lack of 
6 good faith is equated with bad faith, and they found that 
7 that would support a finding for attorney's fees under the 
8 statute. 
9 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Davis says, "Well, they never 
10 really objected to the motion that their property was in 
11 trespass and, therefore, how can they possibly be in bad 
12 faith here?" 
13 MR. HUNT: Well, I don't know what he means by 
14 "they've never objected that their property was in trespass". 
15 We had to try this case in order to resolve it. We went 
16 through a court ordered arbitration, I mean a mediation 
17 proceeding and they simply refused to recognize that they had 
18 caused the damage to the plaintiffs that they, in fact, 
19 caused and we had to take this thing all the way through a 
20 trial, and it was a contested trial. And so-
21 THE COURT: Well, but with that he says that "you 
22 were trying to get 127, Court only awarded the 72", so, you 
23 know, their defense, obviously, is, at least, in part, 
24 meritorious. Comment on that aspect of it. 
25 MR. HUNT: Well, I suppose there's a range - there 
21 
1 was a range of damage evidence and the Court found within 
2 that range of damage evidence, ours was high, theirs was low, 
3 and the Court came down somewhere in the middle. But - and 
4 so with respect to the damages, perhaps, one could say. But 
5 for them to say they admitted the trespass and then for Mr. 
6 Lloyd to get on the stand and testify under oath repeatedly 
7 that he didn't know his house was located in the wrong place 
8 and that he'd lived there for eight years and it wasn't until 
9 we sued him that he discovered that his house was not built 
10 where it was located, he was lying. It was incredible. I 
11 mean, you couldn't be a senescent human being and reach that 
12 conclusion, and with all the physical markers that were so 
13 obvious to everybody in the courtroom and whatnot, and his 
14 own architect even refused to support him and sort of threw 
15 him under the bus during the testimony and distanced himself 
16 from the entire process. And so, you know, from our 
17 standpoint in terms of a finding of bad faith, his approach 
18 to the case is his denial in effect, perhaps, not in his 
19 pleadings, but his denial and unwillingness to come forward 
20 and do something about this problem that he created. 
21 THE COURT: Tell me what you think the burden of 
22 proof is to show this bad faith. Is it preponderance of the 
23 evidence or is it something higher than that? 
24 MR. HUNT: I don't know that the court has ever - I 
25 I haven't found a burden in the statute, quite honestly. 
22 
1 THE COURT: So you're not aware of any higher burden 
2 other than preponderance? 
3 MR, HUNT: Not that I'm aware of - not for the 
4 statutory findings. Certainly, if it was a punitive damage 
5 finding or a fraud finding, then I think that's correct. But 
6 those are because, really you're asking the court to-
7 THE COURT: So we could be in a situation where the 
8 Court determines that there's not clear and convincing 
9 evidence of - to justify punitive damages, but that there is 
10 a preponderance of the evidence that would indicate bad faith 
11 conduct? 
12 MR. HUNT: Oh, absolutely. And I think the 
13 statutory, the statutory standard for bad faith attorney's 
14 fees under 78-27-56 is lower than the standard for punitive 
15 damages. I think the showing both by burden and by 
16 egregiousness is... 
17 THE COURT: So if the Court indicated as it did, 
18 that he came very close to finding punitive damages, but not 
19 quite, it's not much of a stretch then to conclude that there 
20 was sufficient evidence, preponderance of the evidence, to 
21 establish bad faith? 
22 MR. HUNT: Well, I thought the Court's finding was 
23 actually quite consistent with what his statements were 
24 regarding the punitive damage claim because, I mean, it was 
25 a, from my standpoint, looking at the evidence, I thought it 
23 
1 was very, it was a pretty egregious case and that's why I 
2 moved to amend the, add the punitive claim near the end of 
3 the case after we had the discovery done because I'm looking 
4 at this and I'm going, "Wow", you know, "There are a lot of 
5 things here that are very, very difficult to ignore." 
6 So, and I think that - I think really the best case to 
7 illustrate the point that the Court just mentioned is the 
8 Katie vs. Johnson case where the court actually said in there 
9 that for purposes of this statute, the absence of good faith 
10 is the equivalent of bad faith. And, of course, that's 
11 different than what you would have to show in a punitive 
12 case. I mean, it's a lower standard, and so I think that for 
13 a statutory purposes, the Court stating what you have to show 
14 are the two elements that Mr. Davis mentioned, and I think 
15 we've shown them. I think the Court's findings that already 
16 are of record in this case support the award of attorney's 
17 fees. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Talk about the consequential 
19 damages issue and whether consequential damages ought to be 
20 awarded in an intentional tort situation involving, or in a 
21 trespass situation which involves intentional conduct on the 
22 part of one of the defendants. 
23 MR. HUNT: Well, I don't want to mislead the Court 
24 on this because I think that footnote in the Billings case 
25 J accurately sets forth the current state of the law in Utah on 
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1 that, and it, with respect to whether or not, in the, in an 
2 intentional tort case the court would extend that 
3 consequential damage rule to the award of fees, I think is an 
4 open question. I've seen it done. I couldn't find a Supreme 
5 Court case, but I've seen it done, for example, in a breach 
6 of warranty deed situation, where you, you know, you give 
7 someone a warranty deed and then you breach it and the 
8 attorney's fees are often awarded as a consequential damage 
9 of a breach of the warranty and a deed, but, again, that's 
10 more of a, that's kind of a quasi-contractual type case 
11 rather than a tort case. But, I mean, so I think it's an 
12 open question right now in Utah as to whether you could do 
13 that, but - and that's why, I think, you know, when the Court 
14 was ruling I also raised the 78-28-56 issue because I felt 
15 that in just viewing the evidence and given the Court's 
16 comments about how close the Court came to awarding 
17 punitives, that there was certainly enough evidence of bad 
18 faith to support an award under the statute, and so I think 
19 that clearly would support the Court's finding. 
20 THE COURT: Well, just to make it clear, the Court 
21 found that the basis for awarding fees was alternative, in 
22 other words-
23 MR. HUNT: Correct. 
24 THE COURT: - either and/or. So in a situation 
25 where we have the facts in this case, you feel that it is 
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1 foreseeable that the plaintiffs in this case would have to be 
2 incurring legal costs given the conduct of Mr. Lloyd and what 
3 he did? Is it your assertion that he should of foreseen that 
4 the Gallegoses would have to incur legal costs in order to 
5 resolve this problem? 
6 MR. HUNT: Certainly, at some point along the line, 
7 I think he did. I think if he had been really pro-active and 
8 upon immediately discovering the, and I'm put "discovering" 
9 in quotes, the trespass, if he had been very pro-active and 
10 taking affirmative steps to resolve the boundary issue, 
11 tender and offer of a reasonable payment for their costs and 
12 damages and what-not, he could have mitigated this seriously. 
13 There was no evidence of mitigation - zero, none. I mean, 
14 basically, he sat on his hands until the Court entered a 
15 judgment, and now he's still sitting on his hands. And I 
16 think that's, you know, the light has to come on at some 
17 point and I think that's a fact in this case that is really 
18 disturbing to my clients, I know, because they're - they've 
19 felt like what has happened here is their property has been 
20 taken and then they've had to incur the expense and effort 
21 and time to solve a problem that somebody else caused, and 
22 it's been a very expensive endeavor for them. 
23 And so I think that clearly, when you create a 
24 legal problem like this, because or when you trespass on, 
25 J build a permanent structure on someone else's property, it 
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1 becomes a legal problem that the legal system sort of has to 
2 solve because you've mucked up the boundaries and whatnot of 
3 their property and you've got an encroachment. Now we've got 
4 marketability problems and it's going to take the 
5 intervention of, at the very least, counsel and some 
6 cooperative effort and, perhaps, in this case, the approval 
7 of the county council in order to solve the boundary problem, 
8 and at the worst, it involves the court to come in and force 
9 the issue, and that's where we find ourselves here, is we've 
10 had to ultimately resort to this Court for redress of this 
11 grievance because of the inactivity and lack of pro-active 
12 behavior on the part of plaintiff, even after he admits 
13 discovering the trespass. 
14 THE COURT: And you're saying it's on-going now? 
15 MR. HUNT: Yeah, God, I mean, we still can't sell 
16 the lot because the boundary's mucked up, and so we've got to 
17 get that fixed so that Joan and Andy can sell the lot and get 
18 on with their business. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
20 MR. HUNT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
21 MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, may I just address the 
22 issue? 
23 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to have you come up and 
24 answer some questions here first, and I'll let you say 
25 whatever else you'd like to say. 
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1 First of all, you assert that your client doesn't 
2 deny that his construction was basically a trespass; is that 
3 right? 
4 MR. DAVIS: That's correct. 
5 THE COURT: All right. So - and I know that you 
6 intend to appeal because you've already done it 
7 [unintelligible] your appeal, but I'm curious as to why he 
8 hasn't complied with the portion of the Court's order that 
9 would help to mitigate the damages that are ongoing that the 
10 Gallegoses are suffering? 
11 MR. DAVIS: Within a week of the trial, we 
12 immediately contacted Mr. Hoffman and had him draw a new 
13 plat. I passed that on to George, or to Mr. Hunt. Mr. Hunt 
14 looked at it, told us he didn't like that, sent it back to 
15 us. We talked to him and we have had several communications 
16 over the last several weeks. Recently, he's remarked to us, 
17 Well, we really like that way that we originally told us, do 
18 that, so we're not getting, we've already talked to the 
19 homeowners' association. We're getting a plat, about to be 
20 signed that can be approved and move that through. As 
21 recently as last week we talked again, Mr. Hoffman, say "Get 
22 us a plat that then has approval signatures so we can take 
23 it." We have not laid on it. We've been having - and that 
24 first diagram was ordered within a week of after we were here 
25 J and it was within a couple of weeks that we sent it to 
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1 George. So, it isn't true that we have done nothing. We 
2 have not scheduled the meeting yet with the homeowners' 
3 Association. We have talked to officers that we talked to 
4 earlier to say, "This is what we're going to do. Are we 
5 going to have a problem? What size and shape would you like 
6 the plat so we can have it brought appropriately to the 
7 group?" 
8 We're not sitting back on our laurels or our 
9 haunches. We'd be happy to do this today. There's no reason 
10 we can't get it done. But we were not the one that changed 
11 our mind twice as far as which configuration we wanted. 
12 THE COURT: Do you think that having your - one of 
13 your defendants testify at trial where his testimony is found 
14 by the Court to be incredible, whether that constitutes a bad 
15 faith defense in a case? 
16 MR. DAVIS: I don't think so. I think, and I'm just 
17 guessing here, Your Honor, but I think in most of your trials 
18 you will find some of the testimony incredible. They don't 
19 match, the two different testimonies don't match - somebody 
20 is wrong. Somebody's not, either not remembering correctly 
21 or they're not telling you what the truth is. The testimony 
22 of Mr. Lloyd has not deviated one bit from the start. 
23 The Court may have found it incredible. I'm not 
24 here to testify or to be a character witness, but Mr. Lloyd 
25 strongly asserts and continues to assert that notwithstanding 
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1 those diagrams, he did not know, nor did his wife know, nor 
2 did anybody have an inkling that he was on the Gallegos' 
3 property until the Gallegoses came to their door and showed 
4 them a survey. And immediately, what did he do? He called 
5 his surveyor to come out and redo it or relook at it. And 
6 that was not contested. He did come out and they said yes. 
7 And at that point they immediately said, "Can we go ahead and 
8 work this through?" And at that point, the Gallegoses said, 
9 ^No, we're already talking to our attorney. We'll go from 
10 there." This was not a long period of time from the time it 
11 was discovered and the time this lawsuit was filed. We 
12 thought we would settle it. This was a matter of weeks, not 
13 years. 
14 THE COURT: Do you think there's a difference 
15 between the bad faith defense on liability issues versus a 
16 bad faith defense on damage issues? 
17 MR. DAVIS: I don't see that anywhere. I see that-
18 THE COURT: Do you think that he defended the 
19 liability on the punitive damage issue? 
20 MR. DAVIS: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: And do you feel that his defense of that 
22 was in good faith? 
23 MR. DAVIS: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: All right. And even though the Court 
25 found that his testimony was incredible on that - on those 
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1 issues? 
2 MR. DAVIS: When you asked me how I feel, you're 
3 asking a subjective issue. As counsel and as a clerk of the 
4 court, I believed his defense was in good faith. 
5 THE COURT: All right. 
6 MR. DAVIS: I agree with Mr. Hunt that there is a 
7 difference in the standard of, the standard of proof which is 
8 required, the clear and convincing for the punitive damage, 
9 and apparently, cause I see nothing to the contrary, just 
10 preponderance of evidence for the statutory attorney's fees. 
11 THE COURT: So, it's possible that the claims for 
12 punitive damages may not rise to that level, but may rise to 
13 the level of bad faith? 
14 MR. DAVIS: I think so. But if you do go to the 
15 level of bad faith under the statutory damage, it isn't just 
16 that it is being asserted in bad faith. It has to be an 
17 assertion which is without merit. Now, if that's the case, 
18 and even if the Court finds that a portion of the assertions 
19 were without merit, the Court shouldn't be able to award all 
20 of the damages, all of the attorney's fees under that because 
21 a significant portion of that had nothing to do with the bad 
22 faith. 
23 THE COURT: But, again, we have a crossover issue of 
24 whether the bad faith has to be on all parts of the case, 
25 namely, liability and damages versus liability as opposed to 
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1 damages. 
2 Tell me, it seems to me that lacking an honest 
3 belief and the propriety of the actions or activities in 
4 question, that appears to me to be a different standard than 
5 what you' re articulating here with respect to the merits, and 
6 I'm wondering what case you cite with respect to the standard 
7 that you've just-
8 MR. DAVIS: Can I give a copy of this case to the 
9 Court? 
10 THE COURT: Sure. 
11 MR. DAVIS: This is a Tenth Circuit case, Your 
12 Honor. (Inaudible) marked up, if that's all right. And I've 
13 marked, (inaudible). 
14 THE COURT: Well-
15 MR. DAVIS: -starting where it says-
16 THE COURT: Yeah, I guess this doesn't really answer 
17 my question. 
18 MR. DAVIS: Okay. 
19 THE COURT: And it seems to me that the Utah rule is 
20 lacking an honest belief in the propriety of the activities 
21 in question. And I don't know - I don't have the statute 
22 right in front of me at this point, but that may even be the 
23 statutory language, what's the code section? 
24 MR. HUNT: 78-27-56. 
25 MR. DAVIS: That is not the court language though, I 
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1 don't believe that. 
2 THE COURT: "In civil actions the court shall award 
3 reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
4 determines that the action or defense to the action was 
5 without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith 
6 except under subsection 2. 
7 "The court in its discretion may award," this is 2, 
8 "The Court in its discretion may award no fees or limited 
9 fees against the party under subsection 1 but only if the 
10 court finds that the party has filed an affidavit of 
11 impecuniousity, or B, the court enters in the record the 
12 reason for not awarding." So, that's not relevant here I 
13 don't think. 
14 Okay. Well, let me ask a further question and that 
15 is you've heard Mr. Hunt's Rule 59 argument. Respond to 
16 that. 
17 MR. DAVIS: Rule 59 is there so we can make a motion 
18 for a new trial. We don't believe a new trial is required. 
19 This is - we believe this is an issue of law. It isn't even 
20 an issue of fact. 
21 THE COURT: Doesn't 59(e) say that you have the 
22 right to file a motion to amend a judgment, and isn't that 
23 what you're asking the Court to do, alter or amend the 
24 judgment? 
25 MR. DAVIS: That may be in sum and substance what 
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1 we're asking, but we're-
2 THE COURT: When does the clock start to run? When 
3 the final period is put on the attorney's fees award or some 
4 time before that? 
5 MR. DAVIS: For the Rule 59 motion? 
6 THE COURT: Yeah. 
7 MR. DAVIS: It's probably at the, I don't know off 
8 the top of my head, I'm sorry. 
9 THE COURT: All right. Okay. Anything further that 
10 you would like to respond to? 
11 MR. DAVIS: I would apologize if I have been a day 
12 or two late on making objection because there should not be 
13 any prejudice from what we did. We thought we were complying 
14 with what needed to happen because the rule also says that 
15 the attorneys will be presenting their objection to that, so 
16 that's when we made our objection. And I apologize if I have 
17 wasted the Court's time or counsel's time. We thought this 
18 would be the appropriate time to get it before the Court and 
19 we worked hard to get the findings of fact. This was not an 
20 easy findings of fact to try and put together, and counsel's 
21 - counsel and I spend significant of time, amount of time to 
22 try and work those out. And the Court asked us to do that 
23 and asked us to try and work well together and not come back 
24 to the court. So, we specifically listened to the Court's 
25 I findings and tried to stay as absolutely true to them as we 
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rv, ;. ^L we have here a question of law, 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Mr*. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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(Whereupon Ihe hearing was concluded) ;-
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